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ABSTRACT 
 
“GLOBALIZATION AND STATE TRANSFORMATION:  
THE OTTOMAN-TURKISH CASE” 
Özgür Çiçek 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı 
 
July 2004 
 
 
This thesis analyses the transformation of the Ottoman-Turkish state under the 
influence of globalization in a historical context. It is an attempt for 
operationalization of the transformationist argument in the Globalization and state 
literature. The Ottoman-Turkish state had been in the process of transforming into 
initially modern national state then a modern nation state during the era of first and 
second globalizations. Now, in the face of third globalization, it is in the process of 
transforming into a liberal democratic state. 
 
Keywords: Globalization, State, Transformation. 
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ÖZET 
KÜRESELLEŞME VE DEVLET DÖNÜŞÜMÜ: 
OSMANLI – TÜRK ÖRNEĞİ 
Özgür Çiçek 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı 
 
Temmuz 2004 
 
Bu çalışma küreselleşmenin etkisi altında Osmanlı – Türk devletinin 
transformasyonunu tarihsel bir çerçevede incelemiştir. Küreselleşme ve devlet 
literatüründeki transformasyon argümanının operasyonelleştirilmesi için bir 
denemedir. Birinci ve ikinci küreselleşmelerin etkisi altında Osmanlı – Türk devleti 
once modern ulusal devlete sonra modern ulus devlete dönüşmüştür.Günümüzde 
üçüncü küreselleşmenin etkisi altında liberal demokratik devlete dönüşme 
sürecindedir. 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Küreselleşme, Devlet, Dönüşüm. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship between globalization and state has been a widely studied subject in 
the social sciences. Coming from different disciplinary backgrounds, the mainstream 
of the literature theorizes comprehensively on the transformation, however, 
operationalization of the dynamics of transformation has been understudied. This 
thesis may provide a case of operationalization of the transformationalist school of 
this Globalization & State literature. The transformation of a developing state, 
Ottoman-Turkish state, under the influence of political globalization is analyzed.  
Three perspectives- Hyperglobalists, Rejectionists and Transformationalists- have 
dominated the debates on the relationship between globalization and the state1. While 
the Rejectionists2 oppose globalization as a new phenomenon, Hyperglobalists3 and 
                                                 
1 Aydınlı, Ersel. 2002. “Securing the Transformation: Political Globalization vs. Anarchy in the 
Modernizing World.” Paper presented at the Conference on “Globalization, Security and the Nation-
state,” in Ankara, Turkey, June 15, 16. 
2 Brown, Chris. 1995. “International Political Theory and the Idea of World Community.” In Ken 
Booth and Steven Smith, eds., International Relations Theory Today Cambridge, Oxford: Polity 
Press, 90-109. Krasner, Stephen. 1995 “Compromising Westphalia,” International Security 20(3): 
115-151. Krasner, Stephen. (1993) “Economic Interdependence and Independent Statehood.” In 
Robert H. Jackson and Alan James, eds., States in a Changing World. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. Thomson, Janice E. and Stephen Krasner. 1989. “Global Transactions and the Consolidation of 
Sovereignty.” In Czempiel, Ernst-Otto and James Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical 
Challenges. Mass. Lexington: Lexington Books, 195-219. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of 
International Politics. NY: Random House. Hirst, Paul and Grahame Thompson. 1996. Globalization 
in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Government. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. Hirst, Paul. 1997. “The Global Economy: Myths and Realities” International Affairs 73(3): 
409-426. Weiss, Linda. 1998. The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global 
Era. Cambridge: Polity Press. Armstrong, David. 1998. “Globalization and the Social State,” Review 
of International Studies 24: 461-478. Zysman, John. 1996. “The Myth of the ‘Global’ Economy: 
Enduring National Foundations and Emerging Regional Realities,” New Political Economy 1(1): 157-
 1 
Transformationalists4 argue that globalization is a central driving force in the new 
epoch and is the reason behind the rapid social, political and economic changes that 
are reshaping individuals, societies, states and the world order. The Rejectionists, on 
the other hand, conceive globalization as the great myth of our times. While the 
direction of the globalization impact is fixed within the Hyperglobalists, the 
Transformationalists refrain from making absolute claims on the future course of 
globalization5. Hyperglobalists argue that globalization invites the demise of 
sovereign statehood and undermines a world order constructed upon the basis of 
Westphalian norms6. The core emphasis in the Transformationalists is that 
globalization is a powerful transformative force that introduces a “fundamental 
                                                                                                                                          
184. Paully, Louis W. and Simon Reich. 1997. “National structures and Multinational Corporate 
Behavior: Enduring Differences in the Age of Globalisation,” International Organization 51(1): 1-30.    
3 Ohmae, Kenichi. 1995. The End of the Nation State. NY: Free Press. Ohmae, Kenichi. 1990. The 
Borderless World. NY: HarperCollins. Perlmutter, Alvin H. 1991 “On the Rocky Road to the First 
Global Civilization,” Human Relations 44(1): 901-906. Gray, John. 1998. False Down. London: 
Granta Books. Falk, Richard. 1997. “State of Seige: Will Globalization Win Out?” International 
Affairs 73(1): 123-136. Strange, Susan. 1996. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the 
World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Camilleri, Joseph A. and Jim Falk. 1992. 
The End of Sovereignty: The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World. Aldershot: Edward 
Algar. Wriston,Walter. 1992. The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is 
Transforming our World. NY: Scribner. Guehenno, Jean-Marie. 1995. The End of the Nation State. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
4 Giddens, Anthony. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity Cambridge: Polity Press. Rosenau, James. 
1990. Turbulence in World Politics. Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Rosenau, James. 1997. Along 
the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. Ruggie, John Gerard. 1993. “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity 
in International Relations,” International Organization 47:139-174. Elkins, David J. 1995. Beyond 
Sovereignty: Territory And Political Economy In The Twenty-First Century Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press. Sassen, Saskai. 1996. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization. NY: 
Columbia University Press. Cox, Robert W. and Timothy J. Sinclair. 1996. Approaches to World 
Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 296-313. Keohane, Robert O. and Helen V. Milner. 
1996. Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hoogvelt, 
Ankie. 1997. Globalization and the Postcolonial World. London: Macmillan, 134-139. Held, David 
and Anthony G. McGrew. 2002. Governing Globalization: Power, Authority, and Global 
Governance. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Held, David and Anthony G. McGrew. 2000. Global 
Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate. Malden, MA: Polity Press. 
Held, David and et al. 1999. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press.   
5 Mann, Michael. 1997. “Has Globalization Ended the Rise of the Nation-State,” Review of 
International Political Economy 4(3): 472-496.  
6 Held, David and Anthony McGrew. 2000. “Globalization, Regionalization and the Transformation 
of the Community.” Paper presented at the Political Studies Association- UK  50th Annual Conference 
in Ankara, April 10-13. 
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shake-out” for the subjects including states7. The Transformationalists’ main 
argument regarding the state is that globalization is reforming and reconstituting the 
state structure, political community and authority. In the past, the state was the sole 
authority in the state-centric world politics. Today, there are two images of world 
politics that are called state-centric and multi-centric8. In the latter, the authority 
becomes diffused and states seek to share the tasks of governance with a complex 
array of institutions, public and private, regional, transnational and global. How this 
transformation actually occurs at the domestic level is the question that is 
understudied in the literature. This thesis tries to be an answer to this question by 
exploring the transformation of the Ottoman- Turkish state.   The Ottoman-Turkish 
state structure has been transforming since the late 18th century under the influence 
of three waves of globalization. 
This study focuses on the political facet of globalization because it aims specifically 
to explore the interaction of globalization with the states’ political structure. Political 
globalization is related to world order and political organization in the modern world 
that is associated with the traditional state-centric relations and with the emergent 
multi-centric world. Political globalization has transformed the very foundations of 
the world order by reconstituting the state structure and reordering international 
political relations. There are historical forms of political globalization that pressure 
states or state elites9 for change. This pressure does not only come from other states. 
Agents of the emerging multi-centric world such as INGOs, IGOs, transnational 
actors and subgroups are important agents of political globalization. In fact, political 
                                                 
7 Giddens, Anthony. 1998. “Globalization: A Keynote Address.” Retrieved from 
www.telcor.gob.ni/BCS/societal-issues/08/giddens.htm on 06/07/2003. 
8 Rosenau, James. 1990. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press 
9 The state elites are the agents who act in the name of the state to hold the autonomy and supremacy 
of the state in the polity. Heper, Metin. 1990. “The State and Debureaucratization: The Case of 
Turkey,” International Social Science Journal. 126: 606. 
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globalization is occurring in both of the two worlds of world politics- State-Centric 
World and Multi-Centric World. 
A state in the developing world will be the focus of this study because the states in 
this realm seem to be the most in transformation. These are the states that are still in 
the process of state making and in which there exist great insecurities. In fact, state 
security has been the main subject matter of the Third World Security literature10 that 
focuses on the developing world. It is maintained in this literature that lack of 
societal consensus on basic principles of the polity and lack of legitimacy of the 
political institutions bring state security to the fore. The inclusion of the societal 
groups to the political system has been problematic in those developing states, 
because the modernizing role of the state and state elites, and modernization itself 
polarized society to an extent that a fragmented society structure emerged with 
political elites and rival social groups. The state establishment has been concentrated 
on power maximization in order to provide order in this structure. With the help of 
international events, such as Cold War, there is the emergence of a kind of state 
whose agenda is dominated by security. 
It is argued here that political globalization has made a great impact on this security 
state fragmented society composition. Contemporary political globalization, which 
can be associated with liberalization and democratization, has contributed to the state 
security in the developing world by creating a societal consensus based on liberal 
democracy. While changing the security problematique in the developing states, 
                                                 
10 Ayoob, Mohammed. 1995. The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional 
Conflict, and the International System. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Job, Brian L. 1992. "National, 
Regime, and State Securities in the Third World." In Brian L. Job, ed., The Insecurity Dilemma 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 11-35. Acharya, Amitav. 1995. “The Periphery as the Core: The Third 
World and the Security Studies,” YCISS Occasional Paper 28. Acharya, Amitav. 1992. “Regionalism 
and Regime Security in the Third World.” In Brian L. Job ed., The Insecurity Dilemma. Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner. Hazar, Edward and Chung-In Moon. 1984. “Third World National Security: Towards 
a New Conceptual Framework,” International Interactions 11(2): 103-135.  
 4 
political globalization is pressurizing these security states to transform into liberal 
democratic states.  The security of the state has long been dominating the political 
agenda in Turkey. The political regime in Turkey is based on secular democratic 
unitary republic and granted from above by a military distinct from society and 
remain above politics11. This is in contrast with a regime forged through multiple 
confrontations, bargaining, and the professionalization of the military by civilian 
politicians seen in democratic states. Political Islam and ethnic politics has been a 
threat to the regime in Turkey because these currents emerged not only an alternative 
to other political parties but also to the secular-democratic order in Turkey12. A 
consolidated democracy in Turkey could not have been emerged because of an 
indirect military presence in the polity. The military assumed a role of the guardian 
of the regime and this role of the military has been consolidated by various 
institutional arrangements.  
Political globalization affects contemporary Turkish state via two mechanisms. First, 
the European Union membership bid is a strong drive for democratization and 
political liberalization13. Second, transnational democratic forces are shaping Islamic 
and Ethnic subgroups to a democrat identity14. A new social consensus on liberal 
democracy has emerged. This affects the Turkish state by easing the threats to the 
regime security. The form of current transformation, occurring in Turkey, is from a 
security state to a liberal democratic state. Previously, threats to the regime security 
                                                 
11 Heper, Metin. 1992. “The Strong State and the State Consolidation of Democracy: Turkey and 
Germany Compared,” Comparative Political Studies 25: 169-194.   
12 Sayari, Sabri. 1996. “Turkey’s Islamic Challenge,” Middle East Quarterly 36: 39. 
13 Dağı, İhsan D. 2001. “Human Rights, Democratization and the European Community in Turkish 
Politics: The Özal Years, 1983-1987,” Middle Eastern Studies 37(1). Dağı, İhsan D. 1996. 
“Democratic Transition in Turkey: The Impact of European Diplomacy,” Middle Eastern Studies 
32(2): 124-141. 
14 Saribay, Ali Yasar. 1997. “Küreselleşme, Postmodern Uluslaşma ve İslam.” In Fuat Keyman and 
Ali Yaşar Saribay, eds., Küreselleşme, Sivil Toplum ve İslam. Ankara: Vadi, 14-33. Keyman, Fuat. 
2000. Türkiye ve Radikal Demokrasi. İstanbul: Alfa. 
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created a security state structure that was dominated mainly by the Turkish Armed 
Forces. Political globalization is opening the way for a democratic state structure by 
alleviating threats to the regime security. Moreover, international actors are 
pressurizing the military to believe in the prudence of civilian actors to rule the state. 
So, a democratic state is emerging in Turkey in the form of an EU member.  All of 
these mean that the Turkish state is undergoing a prominent transformation. 
Therefore, the Turkish case presents an excellent lab to observe the dynamics of 
transformation and conceptualize an operationalization of it.  
Since the thesis is about historical waves of globalization and the transformation of 
the Ottoman-Turkish state, it gives special attention to literatures regarding the 
history of world order, European system, Turkish state tradition, modernization, 
democratization and civil-military relations. A qualitative analysis of the Ottoman-
Turkish experience is done as a case study. Extensive literature survey has been 
conducted into the books, articles and published thesis and reports. Unpublished 
dissertations and reports have been made use of. Newspapers have also been made 
use of, while Internet sources have been searched through. This present thesis 
provides the basic literature and makes initial analysis that would hopefully help to 
further research. 
In the second chapter a theoretical study of globalization is done with a specific 
focus on political globalization and historical forms of it.  The three globalizations 
understanding explained in this chapter provide the time scale for the analysis of the 
transformation of the Ottoman-Turkish state. The remaining chapters are arranged in 
accordance with the three epochs of globalization. The transformation of the 
Ottoman ancient regime to a modern nation state under the impact of first and second 
globalizations is outlined in the third chapter with the aim of providing the historical 
 6 
background for an understanding of the contemporary globalization and state 
transformation. The fourth chapter deals with the contemporary globalization and the 
emergence of a liberal democratic state in Turkey. The purpose of the last chapter is 
to summarize the thesis, outline the findings and suggest follow up research on the 
topic. 
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CHAPTER 2 
GLOBALIZATION AND STATE TRANSFORMATION: 
A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
 
2.1 Globalization 
 
Globalization as a term and idea has gained increasing prominence over the last 40 
years, however it lacks precise definition. Nonetheless, the term globalization 
captures elements of real life that there is a broadening, deepening and speeding up 
of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of life, from the cultural to the legal, 
the financial to the environmental. It appears to be a global shift; that is, a world 
being shaped, by economic and technological forces, into a shared economic and 
political arena. There are various, often contradictory, interpretations of globalization 
such as, a new US Empire project15, another phase of Capitalism16, a kind of 
historical world system17, discourse of capitalist ideology18, economic 
                                                 
15 Widastomo, Iqbal. 2002. “Globalization: 21st-Century Imperialism,” Jakarta Post. Retrieved from 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/define/1101empire.htm on 15/01/2004. Hobsbawm, Eric. 2003. 
“After the Winning of the War, United States: Still Wider and Wider,” Le Monde Diplometique. 
Retrieved from http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/intervention/2003/06hobsbawm.htm on 
15/01/2004. 
16 Robinson, William I. 2004. A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a 
Transnational World. Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.  
17 Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1998. Utopistics: Or, Historical Choices of the Twenty-First Century. New 
York: The New Press. 
18 Sklair, Leslie. 2000. The Transnational Capitalist Class. Oxford: Blackwell. 
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internationalization19, seeing the world as a single place20 and deterritorialization21. 
Here, globalization is understood as a multidimensional, dynamic process22 (or a set 
of processes) that embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social 
relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional flows and 
networks of activity, interaction and power. “Globalization refers to an historical 
process which transforms the spatial organization of social relations and 
transactions and the exercise of power23.”   
 
2.2 Political Globalization 
 
Political globalization is an element of the huge multi dimensional issue, 
globalization. The main elements of this phenomenon include all the dimensions of 
politics, economy, social and culture. Economic Globalization is a historical process, 
the result of human innovation and technological progress. It refers to the increasing 
integration of economies around the world, particularly through trade and financial 
flows. The term sometimes also refers to the movement of people (labor) and 
knowledge (technology) across international borders24”. Socio-Cultural Globalization 
is the transmission of cultural values globally and the emerging transformation of 
                                                 
19 Hirst, Paul Q. and Grahame Thompson. 1999. Globalization in Question: The International 
Economy and the Possibilities of Governance. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press. Munck, Ronaldo. 2002. 
“Globalization and Democracy: A New ‘Great Transformation’?” Retrieved from 
www.gseu.org.uk/publish/pdfs/ann_ch1.pdf on 12/11/2004. 
20 Robertson, Roland. 1992. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London and Newbury 
Park, California: Sage. 
21 Giddens, Anthony. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press. 
22 Held, David and et al. 1999. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press. Giddens, Anthony. 2000. Runaway World: How Globalization is 
Reshaping Our Lives. New York: Routledge.  
23 Held, David and Anthony McGrew. 2000. “Globalization, Regionalization and the Transformation 
of Political Community.” Paper for the Political studies Association-UK 50th Annual Conference in 
London, April 10-13, 1. 
24 IMF Staff. 2000. “Globalization: Threat and Opportunity?” The IMF Issue Brief  00/01. Retrieved 
from http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200.htm on 08/09/2003. 
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values and societal institutions such as the family and ethno-religious groups25. This 
thesis refers primarily to globalization in its political form (such as how globalization 
transforms political systems and the model of government) because it aims 
specifically to explore the interaction of globalization with the states’ political 
structure.  
Contemporary political globalization is understood in this thesis as a consensus on 
the mutual ideas of economic liberalism and liberal democracy and the pressure this 
creates on states for further democratization that necessitates system-transformations 
in the political structure.  Another reason for focusing on this aspect of globalization 
is that it is particularly liberalization impact of political globalization that leads to a 
transformation in the state structure26. In point of fact, contemporary globalization is 
reconstituting or transforming the power, functions and authority of the nation-
state27. The transformation effect of contemporary political globalization has been 
operationalized in the Turkish case in the form of Turkey’s application and accession 
to European Union (hereafter EU) and the European demands for further 
liberalization and democratization.  
 
 
                                                 
25 Bestor, Theodore C. 2000. “Globalization at Work: How Shushi Went Global,” Foreign Policy 121: 
54-63.  
26 For a similar argument please look at Aydınlı, Ersel. 2002. “Political Globalization versus Anarchy: 
An Operationalization of the Transformationalist Approach Through the Turkish Case.” Unpublished 
PhD Thesis, Montreal: McGill University, Montreal, 2. 
27 Giddens, Anthony. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Stanford University Press. 
Elkins, David J. 1995. Beyond Sovereignty- Territory and Political Economy in the Twenty First 
Century. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Held, David. 1995. Democracy and Global Order. 
Cambridge: Stanford University Press. Keohane, Robert O. and Helen V. Milner. 1996, eds. 
Internationalization and Domestic Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Goldblatt, David 
and et al. 1997. “Economic Globalization and the Nation-state: Shifting Balances of Power,” 
Alternatives, 22 (3): 269-285. Jessop, Bob. 1997. “Capitalism and its Future: Remarks on Regulation, 
Government and Governance,” Review of International Political Economy, 4(3): 561-582. Mann, 
Michael. 1997. “Has Globalization ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-state?” Review of 
International Political Economy, 4 (3): 472-496. Rosenau, James. 1997. Along the Domestic-Foreign 
Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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2.3 Historical Forms of Globalization 
 
The particular form taken by globalization differs between historical areas. It is 
widely argued that there are three great epochs of globalization28:  
 
1. First Globalization, Early Modern (14th – 18th century) 
2. Second Globalization, Modern (19th – 20th century) 
3. Third Globalization, Contemporary (1945 on) 
 
The first globalization was marked by the growing centralization of political power 
within Europe in the form of constitutional monarchies and absolutism. The 
sedimentation of political rule into state structures, the spread of European interstate 
order began in this era. Key features of the modern state system, so-called 
Westphalian model29, became prevalent features of the global order: 
 
1. The world consists of, and is divided into, sovereign territorial states which 
recognize no superior authority. 
2. The process of law-making, the settlement of disputes and law enforcement 
are largely in the hands of individual states. 
                                                 
28 Held, David and et al. 1999. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press. Öymen, Onur. 2000. Geleceği Yakalamak: Türkiye’de ve Dünyada 
Küreselleşme ve Devlet Reformu. İstanbul: Remzi. Kazgan, Gülten. 2001. Küreselleşme ve Ulus-
devlet: Yeni Ekonomik düzen: Ne Getiriyor? Ne Götürüyor? Nereye Gidiyor? Istanbul: Bilgi. Oran, 
Baskın. 2001. Küreselleşme ve Azınlıklar. Ankara: İmaj. Tellal, Onur. 2001. “Küreselleşme ve Ulus 
Devlet.” Özgür Üniversite Forumu, 4: 65-75.  
29 Held, David. 1995. Democracy and the Global Order. Cambridge: Polity, 78. 
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3. International law is oriented to the establishment of minimal rules of 
coexistence; the creation of enduring relationships among states and peoples is an 
aim, but only to the extent that it allows state objectives to be met. 
4. Responsibility for cross-border wrongful act is a ‘private matter’ concerning 
only those affected. 
5. All states are regarded as equal before the law; legal rules do not take 
account of asymmetries of power. 
6. Differences among states are often settled by force; the principle of effective 
power holds sway. Virtually no legal fetters exist to curb the resort to force; 
international legal standards afford minimal protection. 
7. The minimization of impediments to state freedom is the ‘collective 
priority’. 
There was also the initial European imperialist expansion. The rapidly developing 
Imperial powers of Britain and other European states were the most powerful agents 
of globalization in this era. The Ottoman Empire, in the face of these developments 
in Europe, questioned its ancient regime and started to transform itself into a 
European style modern national state. 
The second globalization was constituted by the consolidation of the modern state 
system in the form of nation state as a result of the spread of nationalism. The effect 
of nationalism to the Ottoman Empire was that subjects within the Empire looked for 
national identities. While subjects in the periphery tried for their ethnic identities, the 
Capital looked for an Islamic or Ottoman identity that would include all groups. The 
clash of this rival identities and corresponding political agendas created great 
insecurity for the Ottoman state. In the mean time, liberal democratic regimes formed 
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in Western Europe and USA that would have a substantive influence on the Ottoman 
elite who began pushing for transformation in the state structure. The turmoil in this 
era marked the end of the Ottoman Empire and emergence of nation-states from its 
ashes. 
The third globalization includes the spread of liberal democracy to the globe. Since 
the end of Second World War the modern nation state has become the principal type 
of political rule across the globe and has eventually acquired a particular political 
form; liberal democracy. It is argued that four types of change characterize 
globalization in this particular perspective30: 
 
1. It involves a stretching of social, political and economic activities across 
political frontiers, regions and continents. 
2. It suggests the intensification, or the growing magnitude, of 
interconnectedness and flows of trade, investment, finance, migration, culture, etc. 
3. The growing extensity and intensity of global interconnectedness can be 
linked to a speeding up of global interactions and processes, as the evolution of 
world-wide systems of transport and communication increases the velocity of the 
diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital, and people. 
4. The growing extensity, intensity and velocity of global interactions can be 
associated with their deepening impact such that the effects of distant events can be 
highly significant elsewhere and even the most local developments may come to 
have enormous global consequences. As Immanuel Kant says, we are all 
                                                 
30 Held, David and et al. 1999. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press. 
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“unavoidably side by side31”. In this sense, the boundaries between domestic matters 
and global affairs can become increasingly blurred. 
By comparison with previous periods, globalization today combines a remarkable 
convergence of intense patterns of global interconnectedness, alongside their 
unprecedented institutionalization through new global and regional infrastructures of 
control and communication, including the UN, G7, IMF, WTO, EU, APEC, ASEAN 
and NAFTA summits and many other official and unofficial meetings. In the middle 
of the nineteenth century there were few interstate conferences or congresses per 
annum; today the number totals over four thousand annually32. National government 
is increasingly locked into an array of global, regional and multi-layered systems of 
governance - and can barely monitor it all, let alone stay in command. At the regional 
level the EU, in remarkably little time, has taken Europe from the disarray of the post 
Second World War era to a world in which sovereignty is pooled across a growing 
number of areas of common concern. In sum, driven by interrelated political, 
economic and technological changes, globalization is transforming societies and 
world order. Sandwiched between global forces and local demands, national 
governments oblige to reconsider their roles and functions. The next chapter would 
set the historical background of the current transformation in Turkey. The Ottoman-
Turkish state responded the challenges created by the first and second globalization 
by first transforming into a modern national state and than to a nation state. 
                                                 
31 Held, David. 2001. “Violence, Law and Justice in a Global Age.” Retrieved from 
http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/112held.htm on 04/01/2004.  
32 Held, David and et al. 1999. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 55. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE OTTOMAN - TURKISH 
STATE 
 
3.1 The Beginning of the Europeanization of the State Structure 
 
The beginning of the Western impact on the Turkish politics in terms of state reform 
is generally taken as the beginning of the reign of Sultan III (1789-1807)33. The ideas 
on the transformation in the Ottoman ancient regime dated back to 16th and 17th 
centuries when many Ottoman thinkers wrote memos to the Sultan that prescribe 
various types of reforms aiming to avoid the collapse of the Empire as suggested in 
the theory of Ibn-i Haldun. Hacı Halefi presented a good example of this theory in 
his Düstur-ül Amel in 1653:  
“The social condition of man corresponds to his individual condition, and 
in most matters the one is parallel to the other….First of all, the natural life 
of man is reckoned in three stages, the years of growth, the years of stasis, 
and the years of decline. Though the times of these three stages are 
ordained in individuals, nevertheless these times vary according to the 
strength or weakness of individual constitutions… and these states also 
vary in different societies… when the reckoning from the migration of the 
Prophet (upon him the best of greetings) had reached the year 1063, and 
the lofty Empire of Osman had attained its 364th year, in accordance with 
God’s custom and the natural laws of civilization and human societies, 
signs of indisposition appeared in the complexion of this lofty Empire, and 
                                                 
33 Shaw, Stanford J. 1971. Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Findley, Carter V. 1994. Osmanlı Devletinde Bürokratik 
Reform, Babıali, 1789-1922. İstanbul: İz, 38-39.  
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traces of discord in its nature and its powers…34”  
 
The original features of Ottoman Turkish traditional society dated back to the times 
of Süleyman I (1520-1566) and in the period immediately before the political 
modernization of the 19th century, we find more or less degenerate forms of the 
original Ottoman institutions35. The Ottoman ancient regime was based on a “tacit 
contract” of the Sultan with his subjects based on the religious ideal of the good36. 
There had been an Islamicized version of a Platonic worldview in which the strength 
of the state has been assumed to be identical with the political morality of the rulers. 
In this deeply rooted understanding of the state, it had been thought that the “true 
order of religion”, that is, the true order of morality, is inseparably connected to the 
“true order of the world37”. The absolute power of the Ottoman ruler found further 
support in the old Oriental maxim that a ruler can have no power without soldiers, no 
soldiers without money, no money without the well-being of his subjects, and no 
popular well-being without justice. This tacit contract was the basis of the 
legitimation formula of the Ottoman state that guarantees the loyalty of its subjects to 
the Sultan. The regime had been protected by a group social of elements, the army 
(Janissaries), civilian population of bazaar merchants (reaya) and men of religion 
(Ulema), which balanced the palace of the Sultan in the Ottoman political 
equilibrium. But, it was in the late 18 century that the transformation to a European 
                                                 
34 Lewis, Bernard. 1968. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. New York: Oxford University Press, 21. 
35 İnalcık, Halil. 1995. From Empire to Republic: Essays on Ottoman and Turkish Social History. 
Istanbul: ISIS, 123.  
36 Mardin, Şerif. 1988. “Freedom in the Ottoman Perspective.” In Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds. 
State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980’s. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 29. 
37 Kedourie, Elie. 1992. Politics in the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-21. 
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style state was accepted as indispensable38. 
Sultan Selim III first initiated military reform in the face of defeats against Western 
powers by establishing military schools relying on French instruction39. In fact, the 
turning point was loss of Hungary to Austria in 1783-99 and of Ukraine and the 
Crimea to the Russia in 1768-83, defeats involved far more precious than territory to 
Ottomans; they threatened the very basis of self-confidence. A similar attitude is well 
expressed in a famous poem by Ziya Pasha, “I passed through the lands of the 
infidels, I saw cities and mansions; I wandered in the realm of Islam, I saw nothing 
but ruins40.” For the first time, Ottomans had occasion to question the structure of the 
state in comparison with the Western model41. It is not a coincidence that the 
Ottoman Empire emerged as the Eastern Question on the agenda of the European 
powers- Russia, Britain, France, and Austria-Hungary during this era. 
 
3.2 The First Globalization and The Classical Eastern Question 
 
As it was stated in the second chapter, the first globalization was marked by the 
spread of the European modern state system. The rapidly developing imperial powers 
of Britain and other European states were the most powerful agents of globalization 
                                                 
38 Ortaylı, İlber. 2001. “Osmanlı’da 18. Yüzyıl Düşünce Dünyasına Dair Notlar.” In Mehmet Ö. 
Alkan, ed. Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi. İstanbul: 
İletişim, 38-39. 
39 Shaw, Stanford. 1965. “The Origin of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-i Cedid Army of 
Sultan Selim III,” The Journal of Modern History 37(3): 291-306.  Allen, Henry Elisha. 1935. The 
Turkish Transformation: A Study in Social and Religious Development. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 4-27. Lewis, Bernard. 1968. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 39. 
40 Göçgün, Önder. 1987. Ziya Paşa'nın Hayatı, Eserleri, Edebi Şahsiyeti ve Bütün Şiirleri. Ankara: 
Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı. 
41 Rustow, Dankwart A. 1973. “The Modernization of Turkey in Historical and Comparative 
Perspective.” In Kemal Karpat, ed. Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical 
Analysis. Leiden: E.J: Brill, 95. 
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in this era. The relations between these European powers and the Ottoman Empire 
were conceptualized with the concept of the Eastern Question. Actually, the Eastern 
Question is the operationalization of the first globalization in the Ottoman domain.  
For more than 150 years, from the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74 to the Treaty of 
Lausanne of 1923, the Eastern Question, the question of what should become of the 
Ottoman Empire, played a significant, and even at times a dominant part in shaping 
the relations of Great Powers. The problem was how to dispose of the empire in such 
a manner that no one power would gain an advantage at the expense of the others and 
upset the political balance of Europe. This understanding of the Ottoman Empire as a 
passive pawn in the struggle for power between the Great Powers is conceptualized 
as the “Sick Man of Europe42.” Although the core of the question did not change, 
content transformed in time. In the 18th century it concerned mainly the conflicts 
generated by the expansion of Russia into the territories bordering the northern 
shores of the Black Sea. In the 19th century, following the French Revolution and 
Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815), during which a French force occupied Egypt, it 
concerned the attempts of the subject peoples and their rulers to secure some degree 
of autonomy or independence, and the efforts of the Great Powers either to contain 
the mostly nationalistic tensions thereby generated or to exploit them to their own 
advantage43.  
The origin of the classical Eastern Question has been a debate in the literature. 
Although there is a suggestion that the origin of the question is related with the 
problems created by the first appearance of the Turks in Macedonia in the 14th 
                                                 
42 It was Tsar Nicholas I who said in 1853: “We have on our hands a very, very sick man.” Later, the 
term turned into a widely used concept in diplomacy and social sciences. 
43 Macfie, Alexander Lyon. 1996. The Eastern Question 1774-1923. London and New York: 
Longman, 1.   
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century44. The main debate is between those who argue that the beginning of the 
question was in the second half of the 18th century when the Russian and Austrian 
advanced against the Ottoman Empire45 and those who argue that the 19th Century 
and the end of the Napoleonic Wars is the origin of the question46. The mainstream 
view of the Eastern Question is adopted in this study that takes the late 18th century 
as the beginning.  
The defeats of the Ottoman Empire against Russia and the Treaty of Kutchuk 
Kainarji, Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 altered the Balkan scene in three important ways:  
 Russia gained access to the Black Sea coast, so that for the first time Russia 
physically impinged on the Turkish heartland, including the Balkans.  
 Russian merchant ships got the right to enter the Black Sea, the Bosphorus 
and the Dardanelles, Russian merchants got the right to trade in the Ottoman Empire, 
and Russia got the right to appoint consular agents inside Turkey.  
 Russia became protector of the Orthodox Christians of Turkey, with special 
rights in Wallachia and Moldavia. 
These clauses started a competition among the Great Powers for influence in Turkey 
because no power, especially British, was willing to permit Russia to dominate the 
vast Ottoman holdings. The competition was mainly between Russia and England 
                                                 
44 Marriott, John Arthur Ran. 1969. The Eastern Question: A Historical Study in European 
Diplomacy. Oxford: Clarendon.  
45 Anderson, Matthew Smith. 1966. The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International 
Relations. New York: St. Martin's. Ancel, Jacques. 1927. Manuel historique de la question d'Orient, 
(1792-1926). Paris: Delagrave. Macfie, Alexander Lyon. 1996. The Eastern Question 1774-1923. 
London and New York: Longman. Hozier, Henry Montague. 1878. The Russo-Turkish War: Including 
an Account of the Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Power and the History of the Eastern Question. 
London: William Mackenzie. 
46 Mosely, Philip Edward. 1934. Russian diplomacy and the opening of the Eastern question in 1838 
and 1839. New York: Russell & Russell. European Diplomacy and the Congress System, 1815-56: a 
brief survey. Retrieved from http://www.thecorner.org/hists/europe/congress.htm on 02/01/2004. 
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but it also includes France and Austria-Hungary whose policies made a pendulum 
between partition and status quo. Germany and Italy later joined this group.  
The policies of Great Powers towards Ottoman Empire can be summarized as: 
British saw Russian expansion to the south and straits as a major challenge to her 
interests, ever since the French attack against Egypt in 1798. The guiding principle of 
the British policy with only few exceptions during the first Muhammed Ali Crisis 
and more generally under Salisbury in the years following the occupation of Egypt 
was therefore to deny Russia direct access to Straits and preserve the independence 
and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Before 1840 and after 1871, France had designs 
on the African territories, Egypt, of the Sultan. France therefore supported 
dependencies of the Ottoman Empire in these parts in their resistance to the Sultan. 
Except for temporary policies of supporting the status quo after 1833 and 1897, 
Russia pursued expansionist policies at Turkey's expense all throughout the last 
centuries of the Ottoman Empire. Austria-Hungary joined Russia in the partition of 
Balkans but some times followed status quo policies and cooperated with other 
European powers to balance Russia expansion. These security threats forced 
Ottomans to reform the parts of the state that would help survive the challenge. 
Later, reforms spilled over other branches of the state and assumed a character of 
full-fledged state transformation to a modern state. 
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3.3 Modern National State47 Building 
 
Sultan Selim III set off the formation of a new army under his direct command that 
would both guarantee his position against the Janissaries and the local notables 
(Ayan), on the one hand, and against the modern Russian armies, on the other. But 
this created unrest within Janissaries and Ayans. The Janissaries perceived the new 
army as a threat to their existence and resisted harshly. Sultan Selim III also created a 
treasury for the new army by implementing new taxes that turned public opinion and 
the Ulema against him. Finally, in 1807 the Janissaries rose against the Sultan with 
the support of the Ulema and the populace of Istanbul. Sultan Selim III was 
dethroned and the reforms were abolished.  
The rebels made Mustafa IV the Sultan and limited his power. In fact, “Mustafa’s 
authority was not heeded outside the walls of his court48.” But the extraordinary rise 
of Janissary and Ulema power in the capital, abolishing the ancient regime, generated 
resistance in the Ayans that sees status quo as a guarantee to their position in the 
provinces. Soon the joint forces of the Ayan flocked into the capital, terrifying the 
Janissary and the court. Ayans restored the old ancient regime by making Mahmut II 
sultan and guaranteeing their position with a covenant (Sened-i İttifak). Sultan II. 
Mahmut eliminated one of the basic elements of the old regime, the Janissaries in 
1826 with his new army. The military corps and the administrative officials, 
educated in the Westernized schools that were established by Sultan III. Selim, were 
                                                 
47 National State is used here, as defined by Charles Tilly, in distinction from the nation state. Tilly 
defined national state as “relatively centralized, differentiated, and autonomous organizations 
successfully claiming priority in the use of force within large, contigious, and clearly bounded 
territories.” Nation states, on the other hand, are those “whose peoples share a strong linguistic, 
religious, and symbolic identity.” Tilly, Charles. 1990. Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 
990-1990. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 70. 
48 İnalcık, Halil. 1995. From Empire to Republic: Essays on Ottoman and Turkish Social History. 
Istanbul: ISIS, 131. 
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the backbone of the new centralist absolute political structure. Ayans and bureaucrats 
replaced the Janissaries and the men of religion in the old political equilibrium for a 
while. The Doctors of Islamic law were unable to adjust to new concepts of society49. 
The legal and educational reforms of Sultan Selim III became the graveyard of the 
high Ulema who supported them50.  
Sultan Mahmud II, under the pressures of first globalization, launched an extensive  
program of autocratic reform after the elimination of Janissaries parallel to Peter the 
Great in Russia51. The reformation of the army necessitated a new education, 
administrative and taxation system. An entire new school system was instituted to 
prepare the future officers, administrators and tax collectors of the emerging national 
state. The School of Military Sciences established in 1834 following the Medical 
School and the Imperial Music School.52 Military conscription required a tightening 
of administration in provinces and the cost of the new army had to be borne by 
systemic taxation. So, the Europeanization of the state structure began from the 
military and continued with the other branches of the state such as public 
administration and finance.  
Ayans remained as a threat to the emerging national state but in two decades of 
tenacious struggle, Sultan Mahmud II subdued Ayans and all the provinces except 
Greece and Egypt. The Greeks revolted in 1821 and started ten-years independence 
war. Muhammed Ali Pasha of Egypt had created a great problem for the Ottoman 
state with his modernized administration and army. New bureaucratic elite nurtured 
                                                 
49 Mardin, Şerif 1988. “Freedom in the Ottoman Perspective.” In Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds. 
State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980’s. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 34. 
50 Heyd, Uriel. 1961.  “The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud 
II.” In Uriel Heyd, eds. Studies in Islamic History and Civilization. Jerusalem: Scripta 
Hierosolymitana, 63-96. Cited in Gerber, Haim. 2000. “Ottoman Civil Society.” In Kemal Karpat eds. 
Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey. Leiden: Brill, 134. 
51 Karpat, Kemal. 1967. Türk Demokrasi Tarihi. İstanbul: İstanbul, 14.  
52 Seyh, Mahmud Cevad İbn-us. 1922. Maarif-i Umumiye Nezareti Tarihce-i Teskilati ve İcraati. 
İstanbul: Maarif-i Umumiye Nezareti. 
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first Russian than a complete five power European assistance to pacify the rule of 
Muhammet Ali Pasha. The power wrested from Ayans was relocated in the hands of 
the new bureaucracy. This empowerment of the central government was strengthened 
by changes in the structure and organization of the central government staff. 
Governmental Ministries and High Councils were established. The new bureaucracy, 
trained at first in the embassies at Paris, London, and Vienna and the translation 
chamber at the Sublime Porte- the office of the Grand Vezir, and later in higher 
schools, academies in Istanbul and other cities of the Empire, would be the 
forerunners of the reform process. The successes of Muhammed Ali Pasha in Egypt 
in creating an efficient administration and powerful army with European style 
reforms set a good example to the new bureaucratic elite. This new bureaucratic elite 
served as the most important medium for the internalization of the ideas of first 
globalization and institutionalization of the European style modern state. 
 
3.3.1 The Institutionalization of the Modern National State, Initial Reforms 
 
After the dead of Sultan Mahmud II, his 16 years of son Abdulmecit came to throne. 
With Sultan Abdulmecit, a prototype of new bureaucracy, Mustafa Reşit Pasha 
assumed the leadership of the reform process. Reşit Pasha group was able to grasp 
leadership with their success in nurturing European assistance during Ottoman-Egypt 
crisis. The Tanzimat rescript, Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif of 1839 was created by Reşit 
Pasha’s group, and was the first step for the institutionalization of a national state in 
the Ottoman Empire with new systems of administration and education53. The 
document outlines the new administrative philosophy of the emerging national state 
                                                 
53 Luke, Sir Harry. 1955. The Old Turkey and the New. London: Geoffrey Bles, 47-50. 
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that is in line with the norms of first globalization. The bureaucrats safeguarded their 
position in the system by referring to principles on the safety of lives and properties; 
the prevention of arbitrary punishment. While modernizing bureaucracy had been 
getting power day by day, their status in the system was still not guaranteed. An 
example of this insecure position of bureaucracy in the political system occurred 
when Reşit Pasha group’s teacher and patron Pertev Pasha lost his life in 183754.  
Reşit Pasha group was very well acknowledged the importance of European 
influence in both protecting the state (as it was the case in Ottoman-Egypt crisis) and 
the bureaucratic elites. The political rights that European model demanded were a 
seen as a guarantee by new bureaucrats for their power55. Tanzimat document also 
proposed the establishment of government councils consisting of the military 
political bureaucracy and the religious elite. In practice it is more like a technocratic 
government found in the absolutist states of the continental Europe than 
parliamentary system of Britain. European model also demanded minority rights. 
This was satisfied in the Tanzimat document by emphasizing equal rights to 
minorities. Under the influence of the success of absolutist monarchies in Europe, the 
Tanzimat ministers, Reşit, Ali and Fuad Pashas championed the sultan’s absolute 
power as the most effective force for enlightened reform.  
The European influence to the Ottoman reform process increased after the Crimean 
War. In return for their assistance against the Russians, the British and French asked 
for further reforms in the Ottoman state that had more emphasis on liberalization. 
Western Europeans outlined their demands clearly in the Paris Peace Treaty and the 
                                                 
54 Findley, Carter V. 1994. Osmanlı Devletinde Bürokratik Reform, Babıali, 1789-1922. İstanbul: İz, 
116.  
55 Çavdar, Tevfik. 1995. Türkiye’nin Demokrasi Tarihi1839-1950. Ankara: İmge, 20. 
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Ottomans responded cooperatively by issuing Reform Rescript, Islahat Fermanı of 
1856. 
 
3.3.2 Two Alternative Regime Model in Europe, Constitutional Monarchy 
(Hükümet-i Meşruta) and Absolute Monarchy (Hükümet-i Mutlaka)  
 
When the Ottomans began to imitate European governments in the 18th century, there 
was neither a common constitutional pattern nor an ideal model to which states might 
seek to conform. However, some generalizations are still possible56. On continental 
Europe, the monarchy slowly developed into more absolutist forms. States that had 
been only loosely centralized, such as Austria and Russia, became powerfully 
centralized states, while states such as Prussia and France further tightened the 
centralized control of the monarch. This centralized, absolutist power of the monarch 
was used to effect profound reforms in the military, structure of justice, government 
and economic life. Catherine the Great of Russia was an unashamed apologist for the 
absolute monarchy: “There is no better form of government than autocracy for it 
combines the strength of law with the executive dispatch of a single authority57.” 
Sultan Selim III sent a special envoy, Ebu Bekir Ratib Efendi, to make inquiries in 
Europe. He went to Vienna in 1791 and gathered information on Austrian 
government, society, political thought and the military system58. 
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Britain, on the other hand, had adopted important aspects of constitutional monarchy. 
Contrary to the absolutist movement in the East, a British House of Commons voted 
in 1780 that “the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing and ought to be 
diminished59.” Constitutional monarchy, as sketched by thinkers from the 
Enlightenment onward, is a philosophy of governance, granting the governed a set of 
inalienable personal freedoms, in addition to ensuring the rule of law and the 
separation of powers.  
“It is a ... doctrine of private individual and institutional rights, a judiciary 
dedicated to the enforcement of those rights, a system of representation 
designed to mute the excesses of popular passions, a constitutional 
framework that impedes the hasty translation of public impulses into 
sweeping changes of fundamental law, and, above all, a private sphere 
diverse and capacious enough to mount a stern defense against public 
encroachment60.”  
 
Rival groups emerged in the Ottoman ruling elite emulated different aspects of these 
two alternative types of government according to their interests. While the palace of 
the Sultan and Tanzimat Pashas tried to establish an absolutist monarchy, rival liberal 
bureaucrats and constituent Pashas mostly fought for a constitutional monarchy with 
a parliament that might limit the power of the palace of the Sultan and his fellow 
Pashas. The first Ottoman constitution emerged under such political circumstances. 
 
3.3.3 The First Ottoman Constitution and the Ottoman Parliament 
 
When Ali Pasha, the last first generation Tanzimat Pasha, died in 1871, there were 
two candidates for power in the Empire. First, there were Sultan Abdülaziz and 
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Mahmut Nedim Pasha who wanted to take power back to the Sultan and his close 
associates by abolishing Tanzimat reforms and emerging bureaucracy. The Tanzimat 
Pashas kept Mahmut Nedim Pasha out of important offices deliberately. He allied 
with the Sultan who is also critical of the rule of Tanzimat Pashas. Second, there was 
Mustafa Reşit Pasha, Midhat Pasha, Mustafa Fazıl Pasha who were critical of 
absolutist Tanzimat Pashas and wanted to further Tanzimat reforms in a more liberal 
fashion. During the rule of Tanzimat Pashas, Mustafa Reşit Pasha was kept out of the 
center and served as ambassador in Paris. There he learned about Louis Philippe’s 
Liberal regime61 and he was personally acquainted with liberal circles in France. 
When he returned to Istanbul, he then sought to convince the government to send 
young people to Europe for education. Mustafa Reşit Pasha had a special interest on 
students because students at the military staff colleges, and particularly the medical 
cadets, had already become the center of secret political organizations against the 
authoritarian rule of Tanzimat Pashas. Many young coming from families having 
bureaucratic background went to France and there they learned about liberal ideas 
and other political transformations. These students became important public figures 
promoting constitutional liberal ideology; they tried to spread new concepts such as 
liberty, freedom, and nation in the Empire via new mediums such as newspapers, 
theater. Şinasi Efendi, Namık Kemal and Ali Suavi were the forerunners of this 
group.  Later they assumed the name of New Ottomans’ Society, Yeni Osmanlılar 
Cemiyeti that is specifically aiming a change in the Ottoman State Structure towards 
a constitutional liberalism downgrading the Sultan62.  
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What may have started from above when Sultan Selim III initiated his reform in the 
1790s, by 1875 had assumed a very distinct new face of constitutionalism and soon 
became a weapon in the hands of various echelons of the bureaucracy against the top, 
that is the sultan63. The fundamentals of the program of this society were 
summarized in a public letter written to Sultan Abdülaziz by Mustafa Fazıl Pasha. 
The letter, later called ‘The Letter From Paris,’ stated that64: 
 At the basis of all development and progress lies freedom. 
 Freedom of conscience facilitates public accountability and avoids 
misconducts of public servants. 
 Reforms cannot be realized in the society that has no freedom. 
 The lack of freedom provokes Europeans to intervene in Ottoman domestic 
affairs. 
 Freedom does not impede on the autonomy of the Sultan or the faith or 
traditions of the society. 
 Religion is related to spiritual side of the individual, religious rules do not 
determine laws of one country.  
 A constitutional regime is the legitimate state structure for all countries. 
 The essentials of justice are universal. 
 Against tyranny and autocracy, the only solution is to establish a 
accountable government. 
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The early 1870s brought about the right conditions for the implementation of such a 
program. State declared bankruptcy as a result of several bad harvests and 
skyrocketing military expenditures. The harsh suppression of rebellions in Balkans 
led to protests of European powers. So the Ottoman state was in the middle of a 
crisis. Under these conditions, the criticisms to the absolutist policies of the Mahmut 
Pasha united liberal bureaucrats (senior and mid level officials and Pashas), military 
Pashas and the Ulema on 30 May 1876 when they made the first coup in the 
Ottoman-Turkish history under the leadership of Midhat Pasha. Sultan Abdülaziz and 
Mahmut Pasha lost their power and Murad V was designed as the Sultan.  
But the coalition of liberal bureaucrats, military Pashas and the Ulema did not last 
long. Military Pashas and the Ulema leaders had reservations about a constitution. 
There emerged a great debate on a possible Ottoman constitution. Sultan Murad V 
could not stand all these debates and have gone completely out of his mind65. Later 
Sultan Abdülhamit who would open the way for the first constitution replaced him. 
A kind of constitutional monarchy was established in the Ottoman Empire by the 
promulgation of the first Ottoman constitution, Kanun-i Esasi of 1876. However, 
liberalism has various ideas in it that can be detrimental to the political system that 
the liberal perpetuators of the coup wanted to establish. While political rights, on the 
one hand, lead to the establishment of the parliamentary monarchy, minority rights 
and liberal ideas of self-determination, on the other hand, lead to the escalation of 
nationalist uprisings in the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
 
                                                 
65 Ramsaur, Ernest Edmondson. 1957. The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 7. 
 29 
3.3.4 The Second Globalization and The New Facet of Eastern Question 
 
With the Crimean War Western Europe became more and more aware of the Eastern 
Question and its implications.66  Industrial Revolution and emerging competition for 
raw materials and markets created an additional interest to the Ottoman Empire. In 
fact, the consolidation of the modern state system, the high edge of the Imperialist 
rivalry and the rise of nationalism are the main characteristics of the second 
globalization as stated in the second chapter. The Ottoman Empire launched state 
transformation, in order to be a modern European state, as a response to the 
challenges of the first globalization. Now, in the era of the second globalization, the 
state was facing the rising challenges of imperialism and nationalism. 
The Ottoman Empire had a dual economy in the nineteenth century consisting of a 
large subsistence sector and a small colonial-style commercial sector linked to 
European markets and controlled by foreign interests. The empire's first railroads, for 
example, were built by foreign investors to bring the cash crops of Anatolia's coastal 
valleys--tobacco, grapes, and other fruit--to Smyrna, İzmir for processing and export. 
A European alliance was formed after the Ottoman-Egypt crisis that was committed 
to defending the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire but the rival economic 
interests of the Great Powers, each of which hoped to profit from Ottoman 
disintegration, soon caused the abandonment of this principle. 
The nationalistic uprisings in Bosnia Herzegovina and Bulgaria opened the 
Pandora’s box. The Ottoman Empire tried to respond the nationalistic cause there by 
establishing constitutional monarchy in 1876 but the constitution was anything but 
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satisfactory to them. The Russians were to first to intervene under the pretext of 
events in Balkans. The Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) ended with a devastating 
defeat of the Ottoman armies. The San Stefano Treaty signed after the war was so 
favorable to Russia that Britain and Austria-Hungary went to verge of war to compel 
a revision67. The harsh measures taken by Ottoman authorities against nationalistic 
movements in Balkans turned European public opinion against the Ottoman Empire. 
The traditional British policy of keeping the integrity of the empire began to change 
during this era. When liberal Gladstone, who is zealously supporting national self-
determination, replaced the conservative Disraeli government, British policy totally 
turned against Ottoman unity. Gladstone ordered a naval demonstration on Ottoman 
Albania shores in order to support the independence of Serbia-Karadag on September 
1880.  Moreover, Austria-Hungary embarked on an active expansionist policy to 
compete with Russia and as compensation for the loss of influence in Germany. The 
Congress of Berlin curbed the Russian advances against the Ottoman Empire but the 
partition process of the Empire began on June 1878. The partition policies of Great 
European powers against Ottoman Empire tilted Ottoman governing elite towards 
German influence68.  
 
3.3.5 Young Turk Movement and Constitutional Liberalism 
 
As uprisings emerged in Balkans and Eastern provinces, the liberal bureaucrats lost 
their power and the palace of the Sultan gained dominance in the political system. 
The forerunners of the constitutional liberals Midhat Pasha, Namık Kemal and some 
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military Pashas including Süleyman Pasha were sent to exile. The constitution liberal 
movement was put an end by the closure of the Ottoman parliament, Meclis-i 
Mebusan on February 1878. The end of the constitutional era was severely criticized 
by Britain and France. Russia also took a hostile stance by inciting the ethnic groups 
in Balkans. On the contrary, German Kaiser Wilhelm acted cooperatively. Germany 
did not have an interest in ethnic groups in the Balkans and she has an authoritarian 
type of government. So, the authoritarian policies of Sultan Abdülhamit were 
welcomed. Moreover, Germany wanted to utilize Islamist policies of the Sultan in 
order to gain an advantage against her rivals in the Imperialist rivalry.  
One of the forerunners of the Yeni Osmanlılar, Ali Suavi tried to establish 
constitutional order again by making a coup and replacing Abdülhamit with Murat V 
but he could not be successful and killed by the police.69 Sultan Abdulhamit 
concentrated power in his hands and followed an absolutist policy similar to that of 
Tanzimat Pashas. Sultan Abdülhamit’s policies were in no way a deviation form 
modernization efforts. The demands of the European Ambassadors were satisfied, 
modern schools and academies were supported, telegraph and railway webs were 
established70. There was a particular German impact during this era via delegations 
that help reform in the army, education and public administration. The German 
officers had a great prestige among Ottoman officers and bureaucrats as the victor of 
Franco-German War. Moreover, German influence brought admiration to 
authoritarianism and militarism among the officials. With the construction of the 
Baghdad railway, German influence reached its highest stage71.   
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The constitutional liberals who faced severe Abdülhamit pressure fled abroad and 
established secret opposition organizations such as Ahmed Rıza Bey’s in France and 
Mehmed Murad Bey’s in Geneva that would be called as Young Turk movement. 
While Mehmed Murad Bey’s group supported great power, especially British, 
intervention into the Ottoman Empire for a regime change72, Ahmed Rıza Bey’s 
group rejected this idea73. Meanwhile, academy students, educated in modern, 
European-style colleges and academies of the Empire in Istanbul, became 
increasingly restless under the apparent absolutism of the Abdulhamit rule they 
served.74 These students were particularly influenced by the writings of the Yeni 
Osmanlılar who had been suppressed by Sultan Abdülhamit. They established the 
Ottoman Union, İttihad-ı Osmanli secret underground organization in 1889. Later 
organizations in Europe and İttihad-ı Osmanlı merged under the name of the 
Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress, Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti75. 
The Committee tried an unsuccessful coup in August 1896 and continued its 
activities in Europe, concentrated in Paris and Geneva. In May 1897, the 
headquarters of the Committee was transferred from Istanbul to Geneva.76 The 
Committee lost strength for a while when Mehmed Murad Bey came into terms with 
the Sultan Abdülhamit and stop his opposition activities. Ahmed Rıza’s group 
remained alone in their heading the opposition against the Sultan. They gathered 
under the title of Society of Progress and Union, Terakki ve İttihat Cemiyeti.  
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In 1900, some members of the royal family, Damat Mahmut Pasha (the Sultan’s 
brother-in-law) and his two sons, the Princes Sabahattin and Lütfullah joined the 
opposition movement77. Ismail Kemal Bey, who had occupied a number of high 
positions in the Empire, followed Damat Mahmut Pasha. During the first year of the 
new century, the Young Turk movement appeared to have taken on a fresh 
momentum and to have won back some of the ground lost in the failed coup of 
189778. In 1902, people opposing the Sultan Abdülhamit gathered in an opposition 
organizations congress, in Paris on the 2nd of February upon a call of Prince 
Sabahaddin and Lütfullah. The common features of these organizations can be 
summarized as: 
 They were a collection of various groups of the Empire including Turks, 
Arabs, Circassians, Kurds, Albanians, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. 
 They had ‘Ottoman’ national identity in mind and asserted a ‘common 
fatherland.’ Both their actions and discussions revolved around a central problem- 
How can this Ottoman state be saved? 
 They were critical of Abdülhamit rule and wanted the transformation of the 
regime to a constitutional liberal one. 
 They appreciated the British and French scientific and political philosophy. 
Prens Sabahattin was elected as the president of the gathering. Although there 
emerged a resolution accepted by the majority in the congress, the only tangible 
result of the congress for the Young Turk movement was the division of the 
movement into two. First, there is Prince Sabahattin’s the League for Private 
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Initiative and Decentralization, Teşebbüs-i Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti, 
with its newspaper ‘Şürayı Ümmet’. They supported private entrepreneurship, 
decentralization in the form of an Ottoman Confederation and if necessary foreign 
intervention. They were critical of the Armenian policy of the Ottoman government. 
Second, Ahmed Rıza’s the Committee of Progress and Union, Terakki ve İttihat 
Cemiyeti and ‘Meşveret’ newspaper, which championed state controlled economy, a 
centralized government on the French model with a new Sultan. Ahmed Rıza’s group 
rejected foreign intervention, actually; they represented a kind of Turkish 
nationalism.79 The Young Turk split began to crystallize from the Congress onwards 
as one between Turkish nationalism and Ottoman liberalism.  
 
3.4 Nationalism80, Nation-State Building 
 
While Young Turk movement in exile was torn with differences of opinion, young 
military officers and junior bureaucrats, educated in modern colleges and academies 
of the Empire, became increasingly restless under the apparent impotence of the 
Abdülhamit rule they served, in the face of double nationalist and imperialist 
challenge of the second globalization era. Since they could not be active in the 
Capital, dissatisfied comrades in Balkans and Syria started to form secret 
organizations. The Fatherland, Vatan organization was established in Damascus, 
including Mustafa Kemal, later to became the founder of the Turkish nation-state, as 
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a member.81  Meanwhile, military officials and junior bureaucrats coming from units 
in Macedonia, Anatolia and Syria established Ottoman Society of Liberty, Osmanlı 
Hürriyet Cemiyeti in Salonika. Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti has members such as 
Talat Bey, Colonel Cemal Bey and Fethi Bey. The Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti 
expanded with great rapidity and inevitably encountered the Vatan group. Two 
societies merged under the name of Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti on 1906.  
In the meantime, Young Turk organization in exile gathered the second congress and 
were able to united under the name of Ottoman Progress and Union Society, Osmanlı 
Terakki ve İttihad Cemiyeti in 1907. Ahmed Rıza’s group, who remained as 
minority, persuaded to sacrifice their principles in the interest of unity and subscribed 
to a program advocating a change of government in the Ottoman Empire by violence 
if necessary. 
The unification of all Young Turk organization within and outside the empire came 
in September 1907 when they united under the name of the Committee of Union and 
Progress, İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti. The setup of this second organization was 
vastly different from the first. The differences can be summarized as: 
 They were mostly military officials.  
 Many of them assigned to Turkish nationalism as a defense to other 
nationalistic movements within the Empire. 
 They were under influence of German political philosophy, especially 
militarist, pragmatist state understanding. 
 They proposed authoritarian solutions to save the state.   
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So, the opposition was ready to overthrow the Sultan. The Sultan did not remained 
uninformed of the developments in Macedonia and sent spies to investigate the 
situation there. Invitations were sent to young officers and junior bureaucrats to visit 
İstanbul to accept promotions. Those members of the İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti 
preferred to reject the invitation. The final stage of the revolution was approaching. 
The Third Army Corps came out and declared for the constitution. On July 24, 1908 
Sultan Abdülhamid was forced to announce that the constitution of 1876 was now in 
effect once more. Sultan Abdülhamit was not displaced immediately because the 
İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti was not such strong in the Capital yet. After 1908 
Revolution Ottoman Parliament, Meclis-i Mebusan re-established and the Young 
Turk opposition in exile returned back to the capitol of the Empire. The divisions 
within Young Turk movement reemerged in the parliament in the form of clashing 
groups. The Prince Sabahaddin fraction was the most important group and supported 
by the representatives of minorities who had a double-agenda. While some minority 
representatives cooperated with the supporters of liberalism and decentralization in 
order to get foreign intervention, some other who were the participants on national 
independence movements tried to save time for their arrangements against the 
Ottoman state. Moreover, religious groups, whom the Sultan Abdülhamit had 
supported in order to facilitate order through Islamic faith, raised their voices outside 
the parliament against the Constitutional order and the İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti. 
There were also loss of territory and prestige in Balkans and North Africa. Austria 
annexed Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria declared her independence, Crete announced 
her union with Greece, Italy attacked Ottoman Tripolitania in September 1911, and 
combined Balkan States’ forces attacked in October 1912. Such developments 
pushed Ottoman governments more under the influence of Germany.  
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İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti tried to response both these criticisms inside and the 
challenges outside, by immediately turning into a political party on 12 April 1909. 
Then on 23 April, party ordered the Army of Deliverance, Hareket Ordusu to occupy 
the capital and establish a Unionist government. First, Sultan Abdülhamit was 
deposed and replaced by Sultan Mehmet Reşat. Second, it put Unionist nominees 
into key positions in the government and bureaucracy. Third, the new ‘Law of 
Associations’ and ‘Law for the Prevention of Brigandage and Sedition’ published. 
Fourth, cooperation with Germany was increased. By the end of 1909, Unionists 
established an authoritarian militaristic one-party rule. 
 “The spread of nationalism among the subject peoples of the empire, and 
the final contamination, by the nationalist virus, of even the Turkish 
masters of it, ended forever the ‘Ottomanist’ dream of the free, equal, and 
peaceful association of peoples in a common loyalty to the dynastic 
sovereign of a multi-national, multi-denominational empire82.”   
 
Germany assisted the Unionist government in every realm from economics to 
military. It went to the levels that even the ideology of the Unionist government was 
governed by Germans. Germany appointed an Orientalist Professor, Ernst Jaecks as 
the theorician of the government’s formal ideology, Turkish nationalism, 
Pantürkism83.  
Unionists followed repressive and centralist policies to save the state that are 
continuously criticized by both Ottoman Liberals, gathered under a new party, the 
Liberal Union, Hürriyet ve İtilaf on 1911 and the representatives of the Christian 
subjects of the Empire. The losses in the Balkan Wars and the flow of Turkish 
Muslim refugees into the Empire created demand for more repressive policies. Three 
military officers responded to this rising nationalist ideas by making a coup in 
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191384. From then until 1918 the state was governed by a virtual military 
dictatorship, dominated by three men- Enver, Talat, and Cemal Paşas who were 
members of the second Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti in Salonica. Under these 
three men the mechanism of state power was wound tighter and tighter. The 
opposition groups and parties were broken up, their leaders exiled or silenced. The 
army was established as the dominant element in the political scene in close alliance 
with the İttihat ve Terakki.85 The specialist on violence became the most powerful 
group in the Ottoman society; that can be conceptualized as a “garrison state,86” 
“…almost uninterrupted hostilities (with Italy, 1911-1912; in the Balkans, 1912-
1913; and in the First World War) brought the Ottoman Empire closer being a 
garrison state than it had perhaps been at any time since its infancy87.” The German 
influence also reached to its zenith. German Ambassador Wangenheim, as a typical 
representative of German militarism, involved in every policy of the Ottoman 
government88. In fact, parallel to the situation in the Ottoman Empire, the role of 
military in German political system was increasing. Their rule ended only with the 
defeat of Ottoman Empire in the First World War in 1918. 
The Mondros Truce of September 1918 symbolized the defeat in the First World War 
and put an end to the İttihad ve Terakki rule. It was also the final destination of the 
Eastern Question. The partition of the remaining Ottoman territories in Anatolia and 
Middle East began. The invasion of the Turkish core of the Empire by foreign forces 
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created a popular front within the Empire that first triggered local Turkish nationalist 
awakening. Turkish nationalism had been a part of Young Turk movement but 
Ottomanism prevented its development. Ittihat ve Terakki aspired to follow Turkish 
nationalistic policies but could not be successful. Turkish nationalism became fully 
constituted in the Turkish War of Independence.  
With the beginning of Allied occupations and Greek and Armenian cooperation with 
them, Turkish nationalist independence groups first emerged locally all around the 
Turkey89. These organizations united under the title of Association for the Defense of 
the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti 
through congresses attended by delegates from all over the country. The 1919 
elections and the gathering of the Ottoman Meclis-i Mebusan also amalgamated 
different groups aspiring the end of partition. In January 1920 the Meclis-i Mebusan 
approved a list of principles, known as the National Pact, which united different 
groups claiming various solution to the current situation. However, the 
operationalization of the National Pact was not an easy process. First of all, sultan, 
who was living under occupation in İstanbul, did not approve a struggle by emerging 
nationalistic forces. Government in İstanbul denounced the Mustafa Kemal group as 
the leader of the nationalist act. Second, differences of opinion between groups who 
wanted to save the country continued in the congresses and parliamentary meetings. 
Young Turk fragmentation between liberal and authoritarian continued. While those 
assigned to a more authoritarian, militaristic strategy gathered under Müdafa-i Hukuk 
group, opposition created minor groups. Third, the erosion of central government in 
İstanbul created unleashed local powers that did not want to come under the rule of a 
new centralized government. Lastly the Allied forces alarmed by the nationalist 
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developments and suppressed the Meclis-i Mebusan and nationalist sympathizers in 
İstanbul.  
With the dissolution of the Meclis-i Mebusan by Sultan on 11 April 1920 and the 
deportation of some nationalist sympathizers to Malta, the headquarters of the 
nationalist resistance moved to a city inside the Anatolia, Ankara. On 23 April a 
body of delegates from various nationalistic independence organizations in Turkey 
met in Ankara under the name of the Grand National Assembly. The divided 
nationalistic groups who were already militarily engaged against the Greeks, the 
Armenians and the French united. The Grand National Assembly not only fought 
against the occupation forces but also against the so-called ‘Army of the Caliphate’ 
of the İstanbul government. But the signing of the treaty of Sevres created a massive 
revulsion of nationalistic feeling in Turkey against the regime that accepted it. The 
Grand National Assembly was able to form a nationalist front with a regular army 
under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal.  
 
3.4.1 The Establishment of the Republican Regime, the Single-Party Rule and 
State-Dominant Monoparty Authoritarianism 
 
As the Independence War was well advanced military officials and the Turkish Army 
began to emerge as the leader of the Turkish nationalism and the nation-state 
building under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. Although there emerged differences 
on the nature of the regime within the Grand National Assembly Mustafa Kemal’s 
Müdafaa-i Hukuk group assumed the leadership in the foundation of the Turkish 
Republic in 1923. Mustafa Kemal’s ideas turned into a political party when the 
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Müdafaa-i Hukuk group gathered under the Republican People’s Party (hereafter 
CHP). The military bureaucratic elite who gathered around the CHP undertook 
revolutionary changes such as the proclamation of the Republic, abolition of the 
Sultanate and retention of a separate Caliphate.  
Naturally, there aroused resistance and opposition to the Mustafa Kemal’s leadership 
and CHP’s vision of government. The opposition emerged fully constituted during 
the debates on the 1924 Constitution. The debates were especially on the articles 
regarding the President of the Republic. The opposition did not want to give a lot of 
power to the President, Mustafa Kemal. The opposition gathered under the 
Progressive Republican Party, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası on October 17, 
1924. This first phase of the multi-party period short lived. As the İttihat and Terakki 
Party suppressed the opposition by authoritarian measures, CHP utilized 
authoritarian methods to silence opposition. The Law for the Maintenance of Order, 
Takrir-i Sükun and the war-time type tribunals, İstiklal Mahkemeleri, which were 
introduced by the government after the outbreak of a Kurdish Religious rebellion, 
Şeh Said Ayaklanması in South East Turkey against the new regime, were used by 
the İsmet İnönü government to forbid and abolish any opposition organizations in the 
country. The closure of the Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası was started a period 
that opposition organizations were constantly eliminated. Emerging opposition 
parties the Free Republican Party, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, the Popular 
Republican Party, Ahali Cumhuriyet Fırkası and the minute Workers’ and Peasants’ 
Party, Amele ve Çiftçi Partisi were dissolved by the government through strong 
opposition or direct order. 
 CHP took severe measures to limit the opposition, having in mind the Ottoman 
reform experience and the Ittihat and Terakki period. Mustafa Kemal acted as the 
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charismatic leader and CHP acted as the strong political institution in the formation 
of the modern Turkish nation state. After the death of Mustafa Kemal, İsmet İnönü 
and CHP gave a more authoritarian character to the regime. As Bernard Lewis 
argues, “in the hands of lesser men than himself, his authoritarian and paternalist 
mode of government degenerated into something nearer to dictatorship as the word 
is commonly understood90.” Feroz Ahmad argued that he established “a virtual 
police state91” in Turkey and was “almost guilty of establishing the cult of 
personality92.” Henri Barkey argues that during the İnönü era “politics was relegated 
to the confines of the single party, which gave bureaucratic-military elite-dominated 
state a sacred status93”. Metin Heper have a milder interpretation of the İsmet İnönü 
and suggests that Atatürk and İnönü complemented each other.  
“At the end of the First World War, when the Ottoman Empire was in 
shambles and the country faced the prospect of further and serious 
dismemberment, Atatürk took the initiative and started the Turkish War of 
Independence. Also, following Turkey’s full independence, Atatürk played a 
critical part in replacing the essentially Islamic Ottoman Empire with the 
secular Republic of Turkey and in launching the basic reforms aimed at 
westernization. In the accomplishment of above tasks, Atatürk received 
great help from İnönü, although it must be said that if it had not been for 
Atatürk, these programs would probably not have been initiated either by 
İnönü or others. On the other hand, if it had not been for İnönü, it is 
questionable whether what was accomplishment by Atatürk would have 
been preserved, both during the single-party years and multi-party 
years94…”  
 
It is accepted in the literature that the Turkish Republic is an inheritance, in the form 
a nation-state, of the Ottoman reform process that was undertaken by modernizing 
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military-bureaucratic elite during the last centuries of the empire95. The source of this 
particular social group was the educational reform of the 17th century and modern 
military schools and academies96. The graduates of such schools had a positivist 
approach to social affairs; this approach was emphasized as a means to top-down 
restructure society for the preservation of the state.97 In fact, they conceive the state 
an abstract entity, divorced from society, as well as individual. Military-bureaucratic 
elite has molded the countries national political culture and the republic inherited the 
authoritarian, top-down approach to politics. The adoption of a series of rapid 
reforms by the military-bureaucratic elite was nothing less than a “Revolution from 
Above98.” The Turkish military is a kind of institutionalized expression of this 
heritage of Ottoman-Turkish top-down modernization99. Various scholars have 
interpreted this authoritarian structure with concepts such as strong state, police state, 
military state. 
Metin Heper is the premier of those who argue for the strong state tradition as the 
underlying characteristics of the continuing Ottoman-Turkish political experience. 
The defining feature of this strong state is the existence of some ‘state interests’ 
divorced from the society and individual and protection of these interests by an 
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autonomous social group called state elite100. The defining feature of the state is 
formulated in political terms with the autonomy of the state elite from other agents in 
the populace. Heper argues that state tradition in Turkey is different from the 
continental European experience in this regard:  
“[T]he difference between Turkey and many new countries lies in the 
presence of a strong state in the former, and the state’s weakness… in the 
latter… As a means of political integration, the Turkish state has filled the 
void created by increased praetorianism. For many Turks, this particular 
role has reinforced the legitimacy of the state… But Turkey has also 
differed radically from the continental European countries…: in the 
Ottoman-Turkish polity, the state did not develop alongside the politically 
influential social groups, but evolved by making these social groups 
politically impotent. Even at the pinnacle of their powers, the French and 
Prussian absolutist kings had to grapple with the demands and pressures of 
their parlements and Stände respectively. The Ottoman Sultans, on the 
other hand, faced no aristocracy that could impinge upon the affairs of the 
centre.”101 
 
Jeremy Salt conceptualizes the structure of the Turkish state as a military state where 
the autonomy of the state elite is demonstrated by the ‘supra’ status of the military.102 
Amos Perlmutter identifies the Turkish state as a modern praetorian state in which 
the military tends to intervene and potentially could dominate the political system103. 
Ahmet İnsel and Ilhan Üzgel join Perlmutter by arguing that the state structure in 
Turkey is a one of Praetorian state104.  
“The political processes of this state favor the development of the military 
as the core group and the growth of its expectations as a ruling class; its 
political leadership (as distinguished from bureaucratic, administrative, 
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and managerial leadership) is chiefly recruited from the military, or from 
groups sympathetic, or at least not antagonistic, to the military. 
Constitutional changes are effected and sustained by the military, and the 
army frequently intervenes in the government. In a praetorian state, 
therefore, the military plays a dominant role in political structures and 
institutions105.” 
  
It is argued in this chapter that despite their differences in terminology, all 
interpretations point out a bureaucratic-authoritarian state that is ruled by a guardian 
regime at the core of which lies the Armed Forces106. In fact, in the Turkish case, 
before facing the pressures of third globalization for state transformation, Turkey has 
already built up an authoritarian-bureaucratic regime that had long been facing 
domestic and international pressures for change. The purpose of the next chapter is to 
analyze the transformation of the Turkish state in the face of third globalization.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
FROM NATIONAL SECURITY STATE TO A LIBERAL 
DEMOCRATIC STATE 
 
The establishment of the Turkish Republic was a sufficient reply to the challenge of 
the second wave of globalization that necessitated the foundation of modern nation 
state. However, the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s insistence on democracy as a 
pretext to declare war against Germany in 1917 gave a clue to predict what 
challenges are going to come next. In the years immediately after the First World 
War, a promising era of democracy seemed to be starting107. The autocratic regimes 
in Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Ottoman Empire were all overthrown and 
replaced by republics. The seven newly created states in Europe all adopted the 
republican form of government. Democracy seemed triumphant in the post war 
world. Yet within two decades, many democratic countries in Europe were taken 
over by some kind of dictatorship108. Russia became a Communist state; Italy and 
Germany became Fascist states. Only Britain and France in Europe remained 
staunchly democratic. Actually, international order created after the First World War 
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brought nationalist and militarist cadres to the fore in Europe109. The triumph of 
democracy had to wait until the end of Second World War.  
After the First World War, there was little political stability in Europe. In Eastern 
Europe, the new states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Latvia, Estonia, 
Lithuania and Finland were always threatened by the rapid increase in the national 
strength of Communist Russia. In Central Europe, the Germans always desired a 
revision of the Treaty of Versailles. They would give full support to a government 
that advocated a strong hawkish foreign policy. In Southern Europe, the Italians also 
had antipathy towards the Versailles Settlement because the Allied failed to realize 
the territorial ambitions of Italy as were promised in the Treaty of London of 1915. 
There were only two states in Europe that hoped to preserve the Versailles 
Settlement. They were Britain and France. As both Britain and France were seriously 
weakened by the war, it is uncertain that they would be ready to make a costly war 
against any aggressors who were determined to revise the Versailles Settlement. 
Moreover, the First World War left devastating economic problems on all the 
European countries. The long-term result of these economic problems was that in 
order to solve their economic problems, most of the European nations tried to 
become economically self-sufficient and to keep out the products of other countries 
by building high tariff walls. Economic nationalism was a bad sign for the peace of 
Europe. In sum, the harshness of the peace treaties created nationalist upheavals and 
aggressive policies in Germany, Italy and Japan. The Allied remained too passive 
and the League of Nations failed to secure peace110.  
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The Second World War started with the invasion of Poland by Germany in 1st 
September 1939. Germany and Italy quickly occupied most of continental Europe. 
Britain and Soviet Union stood against the axis powers of Germany, Italy and Japan. 
Military efforts were accompanied by a series of important international meetings on 
the political objectives of the war. The first of these took place in August 1941 
between President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. They 
issued a joint declaration on the purposes of the war that is called the Atlantic 
Charter111. Just as Wilson's Fourteen Points delineated politics of the First World 
War, so the Atlantic Charter provided the criteria for the Second. President 
Roosevelt, who had been a member of the Wilson administration, argued for the 
possibility of a world governed by democratic processes, with an international 
organization serving as an arbiter of disputes and protector of the peace.  
With the eventual American entry into the war, Britain gained vital reinforcements in 
men and supplies. The German and Japanese supply lines were at full stretch, and 
eventually a string of victories forced the enemy to retreat. Victory at El Alamein led 
eventually to the Germans being driven from North Africa, and the invasion of Italy. 
Soviets, on the other hand, launched a counter-offensive at Stalingrad where the most 
important battle in the eastern front took place. Leaders of the United States, Soviet 
Union and Britain, so called Big Three, met in Tahran, discussed on the final assault 
on the Axis. The planned invasion of France by the allies took place in June 1944. 
Big Three gathered again in the Yalta Conference and this time discussed on the 
post-war structure.  
The surrender of German forces symbolized the victory in Europe. The Charter of 
the United Nations, international organization, designed by the Big Three for post-
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war order, signed in San Francisco. Within three months Second World War was 
totally over with the surrender of Japan. During the Second World War, under the 
leadership of İsmet İnönü, Turkey tried to stay at an equal distance to Germany, 
Soviet Union and Britain. Turkey signed peace, cooperation and non-aggression 
treaties with both the allied and axis powers to have recognition of its neutrality from 
both sides; Deringil conceptualized this policy as “active neutrality112.” 
The United Nations officially born in October 1945 and the Big Three started to 
establish a new world order. They launched policies that would furnish friendly 
regimes in the respective states and regions under their control. The victory of 
Second World War was in large part understood as a victory over authoritarian 
single-party regimes. While Britain and the U.S. supported democratization in 
Western Europe and Japan, Soviet Union backed establishment of socialist regimes 
in Eastern Europe. American and British occupation policies in especially West 
Germany and Japan made a major contribution to the global spread of democracy. In 
fact, Western European experience in democratic regime building would provide the 
example and tools to initiate similar processes in other countries. Towards the end of 
the Second World War, Turkey began to feel double pressures of democratic West 
and the Socialist East.  
 
4.1 Democracy in the West and the Multi Party Period in Turkey 
 
After the World War II, Western countries appeared to be increasingly concerned 
with the promotion of democracy and Ankara, ruled by a single-party authoritarian 
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system since the initiation of the Republic, began to consider transformation of the 
regime toward a multiparty system113. The reasons for the Turkish transition to multi-
party system are one of the hotly debated issues of the Turkish politics. While some 
accounts stress on the domestic changes and İsmet İnönü’s firm personal 
commitment to democratization114, others emphasize the external pressures such as 
the growing Soviet threat and the democratic wave in the Western countries115. İsmet 
İnönü’s answer to Rustow on foreign policy considerations influencing his decision 
to announce democracy shows that the he hoped to nurture the support of the 
victorious Western democracies through democratization against Soviets. İnönü said 
“all that slander that has been spread about me, as if I had been swimming with the 
stream.” “And suppose I had been swimming with the stream; that, too, is a 
virtue116.” However, these words also symbolize that there is an appreciation in the 
Turkish politicians side of a wave of democracy.  
Another indication of the Turkish officials comprehension of democracy as an 
essential requirement of joining the West was Telegrams of the Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs specifying that “a Turkey with a single-party regime and a 
dictatorship-like structure, which had narrowed individual rights and freedoms even 
further during the war years, had to be transformed into a liberal political 
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regime117.” In fact, the dividends of the implementation of the multi party politics 
quickly realized. The U.S. supported Turkish cause in the straits by organizing a visit 
of the U.S. battle ship Mississippi to Istanbul. Moreover, the Truman government 
through foreign aid supported the implementation of the multi party politics in 
Turkey. Truman declared that the U.S. aid was given to Turkey in order to help the 
establishment and development of democracy in Turkey118. 
The introduction of multi-party politics symbolize an end to the Single-Party years 
when the state was governed by a closed military-bureaucratic elite whose roots goes 
back to the Union and Progress party. Democrat Party, established in 1946, gathered 
all oppositional movements including those of the heritage of the Ottoman elites- 
liberals, local notables- and new social groups created and motivated by the modern 
economic forces such as, entrepreneurial. Professional and social background 
research shows that: 
 “[I]n the political alignments of the late 1940s and 1950s, the CHP, which 
combined governmental officials, some large landowners, and a substantial 
portion of the more backward peasantry, was opposed by the Democrat 
Party backed by the commercial middle class, the urban poor, and the more 
modern sections of the rural population119.” 
  
The inclusion of social groups to the political arena was a very significant break in 
the Ottoman-Turkish political history. A major characteristic of the Ottoman-Turkish 
politics since the inception of modern state building had been that political arena was 
limited to the members of the elite and intra-elite conflict. While it was the Sultan, 
the bureaucracy and pashas during the Ottoman period, CHP and the military-
                                                 
117 Kuneralp, Zeki. 1982. İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Dış Siyaseti: Dışişleri Bakanlığının 11 
Telgrafı. İstanbul: İstanbul, 89. Cited in Aydınlı, Ersel. 2002. “Political Globalization versus Anarchy: 
An Operationalization of the Transformationalist Approach Through the Turkish Case.” Unpublished 
PhD Thesis, Montreal: McGill University, Montreal, 105. 
118 McGhee, George. 1990. The US-Turkish-NATO-Middle East Connection: How the Truman 
Doctrine Contained the Soviets in the Middle East. London: Macmillan, 23-24. 
119 Özbudun, Ergun. 1976. Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 47. 
 52 
bureaucratic elites monopolized the authority during the first decades of the republic. 
It was led by the two charismatic leaders Atatürk and İnönü, and supported 
enthusiastically by the secularized, progressivist urban intelligentsia made up of 
university and literary circles, teachers, lawyers, petty officials and so on. Social 
groups could hardly have been active in politics, national aristocracy simply did not 
exist, and the urban commercial class and the landed notables had neither the 
political organization nor the power to challenge the CHP and military-bureaucratic 
elite. In this context, the character of Single-Party rule is best defined as 
“authoritarian politics in an incorporated society120.”  
 
4.2 The Third Globalization and Democracy in Turkey  
 
With the third globalization, nation states began to acquire a particular political form, 
liberal democratic state. The multi party system and the incorporation of society into 
the political system widely symbolized Turkish states’ shift to a democratic state. In 
the period 1946-1959, elite competition spilled over into society, and mobilized new 
social groups. “The theater of conflict among the elite became the society itself, 
rather than the palace, the bureaus of the civil servants, or the back rooms of the 
single party121.” Democrat Party defended liberal economic policies against the 
statist policies of the CHP. The basis of the support to these policies was that they 
were seen as a possible way to weaken state elite.  The program and ideology of the 
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Democrat Party included various ideas and issues but “…the foremost or the most 
raised issue was the cultural reaction or resentment to authoritarian modernization 
efforts or revolutions122.” However, even these ideas and policies of populist appeal 
and the existence of a wide clientelist network that was fed by distributive policies 
were able to overcome the low institutional penetration of society that it had 
inherited from the past. “The network of patron-client relations, the appeal to 
religious sentiments, and populism were, in fact, attempts by the Democrat Party to 
overcome its institutional shortcomings by rewarding regional cliques, kinship ties, 
religious demands, and personal influence networks123.”  
 
4.2.1 Democracy and Great Divide in Turkey: State Elites vs. Political Elites 
 
Throughout the 1950s, the CHP remained in opposition. Support for the party came 
largely from the military-bureaucracy establishment, the traditional local notables of 
eastern Turkey and the intelligentsia. The opposition of the CHP was limited to the 
tactics of provoking the administrative and juridical bureaucracy and the 
intelligentsia to determination against the Democrat Party. In this context, there 
emerged the potential for emergence of a state vs. political elite divide. Until the 
launching of multi-party politics, there had been no separation within the state 
structure in terms of power sharing between the state bureaucracy and the single 
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party elite; the state and the party were virtually the same entity124. Democrat Party 
policies to control government influence by providing a check on the CHP and its 
constituent military-bureaucracy and intelligentsia marked the beginning of an era in 
which power diffusion was to be forced by competition between the state elite 
(military-bureaucracy) and the political elite.  
4.3 Military Coup, 1960 and the Emergence of National Security State 
 
The Democrat Party’s attempts to limit the power of CHP and military-bureaucratic 
elite, naturally, created objections. Secret organizations re-emerged within the army 
after 40 years when the roots of the Union and Progress Party first emerged as secret 
political organizations. “One author, whose father was an influential member in 
some of these organizations, counted at least seven different ones, and two allied 
groupings among them125.” These organizations held various views and ideologies 
but the common denominator was that the Turkish state was not ready for this type of 
democratic experience which would shift domestic power balances and, therefore, 
allow a threatening potential to form. Eventually, on May 27, 1960, a group of 
officers who had been meeting in secret organizations conducted the first coup in the 
history of the Turkish Republic.  
The perpetuators of the 1960 coup faced similar problems with those of the 1908 
coup, secret organizational structure does not provide a solid basis to govern country 
lacking hierarchical ranks and discipline. One of the perpetuators, Orhan Erkanlı, 
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later confessed that “we had done the 27 May Coup but we did not know what to do 
in the 28th May126.” Although, the single-party bureaucracy and intelligentsia 
supported the 1960 Coup, military could not avoid divisions. Two alternative 
organizations, National Unity Committee, Milli Birlik Komitesi and Armed Forces 
Union, Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği emerged within the Turkish Armed Forces. Silahlı 
Kuvvetler Birliği, which was an “umbrella organization” gathering to control the 
potentially uncontrollable elements and formations within the army, acquired the first 
hand127. Under the leadership of the Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği, a coalition of generals, 
CHP and intelligentsia emerged. The three leaders of the Democrat Party, including 
the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes were hanged. The 1961 constitution was 
adopted and elections were held. The results of the first general elections were 
generally disappointing for the coalition elite, as majority of votes went to Justice 
Party, which was following the former Democrat Party’s vision of government. 
Radical voices within the army, which had been suppressed by the coalition generals, 
began to reemerge in Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği. Radical groups gathered around Talat 
Aydemir tried two failed coups. Several of the failed coup leaders were sentenced to 
death and long jail terms. Talat Aydemir was hanged in July of 1964128.  
The execution of the leaders of the emerging political elite and the leader of radicals 
in the military-bureaucracy set the new power configuration in Turkey composed of 
state vs. political elites. Turkey’s second attempt at democratic rule began with this 
new balance of power and institutionalization imposed from above, this time with the 
institutions that were established during the military interregnum between 1960 – 61. 
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In the face of the popular support mobilized by the leadership of the Democrat Party, 
military-bureaucracy and the authors of the constitution were on the defensive 
against centralization of power and concentration of function in the hands of political 
elites. As a consequence, power was dispersed, institutions carefully differentiated, 
and bureaucratic checks and controls were established against the power of the 
parties. However, despite the checks and controls placed on the power of the parties 
after 1961, the infiltration of the political system, bureaucracy, intelligentsia and 
society at large by parties steadily increased. Moreover, the policies of the Western 
powers in the Third World through and the Cyprus and Palestine policy of the U.S. 
especially created uprisings and polarization in Turkey. The anti Americanism led to 
radicalism of the left and right wing parties. While left wing, traditionally 
represented by the CHP, shifted to Socialist Left; the right wing, represented by 
Democrat and Justice party tradition, weakened and political Islam gained power. 
The following fragmentation and the intensive ideological polarization brought with 
it two military interventions in 1971 and 1980. In these interventions not only the 
power of political parties curbed but the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia were also 
excluded out of the core of the regime. During these years, a national security state 
emerged at the core of which lies the guardian Turkish Armed Forces. 
 
4.4 The Cold War and The National Security State 
 
The 1960 Coup and following institutionalization of an authoritarian national 
security state attracted little attention in the world politics.  The emerging Cold War 
rivalry dominated the agenda of the international politics and the rise of interest to 
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the internal regimes of the states halted with in the face of geopolitical interests. The 
promotion of democratic regimes remained as an important part of the Western 
policy but when it collides with the geopolitical interests, it was underestimated129. 
The Soviet threat and geopolitical considerations guaranteed a seat to authoritarian 
bureaucratic Turkey in the democratic Western Alliance through membership in 
institutions such as OECD in 1948, Council of Europe in 1949 and NATO in 
1952.130 A discourse of national security, emerged during the Cold War period, 
helped the consolidation of the existing authoritarian bureaucratic state in Turkey in 
the form of a national security state131 at the core of which lies the Turkish Armed 
Forces (hereafter TAF). Such a state structure was strongly supported by the U.S. 
because while anti American groups were kept under control, Turkey did not move 
to any kind of regime that would alienate Turkey from its Western orbit132. The core 
of the Western alliance, the U.S. and the core of the Turkish politics, TAF agreed on 
the political equilibrium in Turkey that is necessarily not communist and anti-
Western. The institutionalization of this political equilibrium was done by the TAF 
through military interventions and by execution of those who deviated from this 
equilibrium. The list of such political executions includes the leaders of the 
Democrat Party, the leaders of the failed coups and the leaders of the socialist left 
groups in Turkey. In fact, all crises in the Turkish-American relations happened 
when multi party politics were active and relations were extraordinarily smooth 
during the military rule periods133. The U.S. supported military interventions to 
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secure stability in the short term. Military rulers were immediately pressurized by the 
U.S. to return to civilian rule in the middle term because prolongation of the military 
rule may take Turkey out of the Western orbit that may mean instability in the long 
term. 
 
4.5 The Political Role of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) 
 
TAF has a presence in Turkish politics since the establishment of the republic that 
can be traced back to its roots in the Ottoman-Turkic History. According to Feroz 
Ahmad:  
“The emphasis on the army’s role in Turkish history and politics, from 
Ottoman times to the present, suggests a continuity which seems plausible. 
It assumes that the army was an institution that never changed its world 
view, that it stood above society and acted independently of it134.”  
 
There are several typologies and models on Civil-Military relations in the literature. 
William Hale presents, on the basis of the work of Eric Nordlinger, Morris Janowitz, 
Christopher Clapham and George Philip, three models of military regimes, which are 
relevant to the Turkish case135: 
1. The moderator or veto regimes where the state still is directed by civilian 
politicians, but the armed forces exercise veto power, without taking over power 
itself. The military can restrict or direct the decisions by the civilian governments in 
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many ways. Generally the moderator regimes are conservative, and may carry out 
‘displacement coups’, where another one more acceptable to the military replaces the 
civilian government. 
2. The guardian regimes where the military exercise a higher degree of 
penetration and control. A fundamental characteristic of the guardian regime is that 
the military take over direct political power without intending to exercise it 
indefinitely, and they proclaim their duty is to ‘sort out the mess’ the civilian 
politicians created, and return the power to the civilians after having created 
conditions which will not lead to a new need for a military intervention. Hale 
underlines that the guardian regimes, like all military regimes, are authoritarian and 
limit civil rights, 
3. The ruler regimes which exercise a far greater political control, and for a far 
longer period, than the previous three models. The military leaders of a ruler regime 
aim to effect long-term changes in the distribution of political power by 
overthrowing existing political institutions. 
There is a wide consensus in the literature that TAF provide a good example to the 
guardian regime model136. According to Ümit Cizre, TAF’s political role has shifted 
between each of Robin Luckham137’s four sub-types of military guardianship138. The 
first of the sub-types is ‘Direct Guardianship’ where the military views itself as the 
unique custodian of national values, the second, ‘Alternating Guardianship’ where 
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the dynamics are the same but the military alternates in and out of power, and thirdly 
the ‘Catalytic Guardianship’ whereby the military in question may not wish to rule 
itself but installs governments favorable to itself. The last category is ‘Covert 
Guardianship’; the military may submerge and yet retain the capacity for direct 
action by supporting over the long run a political order that supports national 
security. Actually, TAF develops a self image as the guardian of the founding 
principles of the state and the mandate of the TAF’s influence over Turkish politics 
has been determined by various legal arrangements and de facto powers that are 
conceptualized mainly by two concepts: ‘guardianship concept’ and the ‘national 
security concept’.  
This guardianship of the TAF has been institutionalized through legal mechanisms 
since the inception of the republic. However, the introduction of the National 
Security Council in the 1961 Constitution symbolized a turning point, the beginning 
of the consolidation of a national security state. The rationale of the national security 
emphasizes both external and internal/regime security. The core state elite, military 
bureaucracy categorized all kinds of opposition to their authority as a threat to 
national security. This opposition groups include political elites and social groups 
that criticize the regime and the authoritarian modernization. As a result, the political 
elites and social groups were kept under close scrutiny. In this context, an analysis of 
the legal basis of the guardianship role of the TAF is important because it is in this 
domain we can find concrete criteria for evaluating the national security state and the 
impact of third globalization on it.  
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 4.5.1 Constitutional & Legal Basis of the Guardianship of the TAF  
 
The constitutional role of the Armed Forces had been a hot debate during the 
establishment of the Republic. As a principle, it is determined that active members of 
the Armed Forces should be out of the legislative and executive part of the 
government. The first action towards this end was on 3 March 1924, when the 
caliphate abolished, the Chief of General Staff was deprived of his seat in the cabinet 
and made directly responsible to the president. The point was underlined by Article 
23 of the Constitution of April 1924, which stated, “No person may be a deputy and 
hold office under the Government at the same time.” Moreover, Article 40 vested 
supreme command of the armed forces in the Grand National Assembly, 
“represented by the president of the republic.”139 Finally, Article 148 of the Military 
Penal Code, 22/05/1930, reinforced the interference of armed officers to the politics. 
However, the ‘guardianship concept’ had emerged during that years. In 1931, for 
example, Atatürk declared:  
 “… [T]he Turkish nation… has always looked to the military… as the 
leader of movements to achieve lofty national ideals… When speaking of 
the army I am speaking of the intelligentsia of the Turkish nation who are 
true owners of this country… The Turkish nation considers its army to be 
the guardian of its ideals.”140 Moreover, in another occasion Atatürk said, 
“Our Republic respects only the will of the people and the guidance of the 
military.”141 
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 4.5.1.1 The Army Internal Service Code and Regulations 
 
The idea of Turkish Armed Forces as the guardian of the state was adopted into law 
in 10/06/1935 through the Army Internal Service Code, Article 34. The law 
specified, “The duty of the armed forces is to protect and safeguard the Turkish 
fatherland and the Turkish Republic as defined by the Constitution”. Later, this 
would be repeated in the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Code of 04/01/1961, 
Article 35142. This concept of the ‘guardianship of the state’ politicized143 and 
invoked in later military interventions as “armed forces have invoked the powers 
granted to them by the Services Code to protect and look after the Turkish 
Republic.”144 During the 1960-1998 period the military gradually assumed an active 
role as the guarantor of regime stability in Turkey145. In the most of Third World 
countries, militaries combine external defense with an internal security function146. 
Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Code embodies the notion 
of internal enemies and legitimizes military’s intervention into politics. In addition, 
Article 85 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Regulations stipulates that 
the “Turkish Armed Forces shall defend the country against the internal as well as 
the external threats, if necessary by force.”147 Moreover, section the defense white 
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paper specifies the duty of armed forces to protect the Turkish Republic against 
internal and external enemies148. These articles function as a legal-constitutional 
channel for military to exert power on the three branches of government; executive, 
legislative and justice. 
 
4.5.1.2 The General Staff 
 
The place of the General Staff in the official hierarchy has interpreted as a symbol of 
prestige and influence of Armed Forces in the political community. During the war 
of independence the Chief of Staff held a seat in the 11-member government by 
Law149, No: 3 on 02/05/1920. After the war of independence, the Chief of Staff was 
deprived of his seat in the cabinet and made directly responsible to the president by 
the Law150, No: 429 on 03/03/1924.This position of the Chief of Staff was reinforced 
by the Article 40 of the Constitution of 1924.  The İnönü government through Law, 
No: 4580 on 05/06/1944, terminated the independent status of the General Staff. The 
Chief of Staff was placed under the Ministry of Defense and made responsible to the 
Prime Minister. Finally, in 30/05/1949, the General Staff was relegated to its most 
subordinate position in the history of the Republic, transformed into an 
undersecretariat of the Ministry of Defense through Law151 No: 5398.  
The military intervention of 27 May 1960 ended this subordination of the General 
Staff. The Constitution of 1961, Article 110 restored the position of the General Staff 
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as directly responsible to the Prime Minister rather than the Minister of Defense. 
Later, on 14 February 1966, the Constitutional Court abolished the articles 1, 2 and 3 
of the Law No: 5398 that put the Chief of Staff into a subordinate position by 
arguing that these articles are in conflict with the constitution Article 110. Finally, 
the Law152 No: 1324 on duties and competences of the General Staff, 31/07/1970, 
reinforced this position of the General Staff as working in collaboration with the 
Ministry of Defense and responsible to the Prime Ministry. In fact, two separate laws 
passed in 1970 specified the duties of the General Staff and the Minister of Defense. 
The General Staff obtained autonomy in determining defense policy, the military 
budget153, future weapons systems, production & procurement of arms154, 
intelligence gathering, internal security, and all promotions. The Ministry of Defense 
carried out tasks according to the principles, priorities and major programs as 
determined by the General Staff. As a result of this wide range of roles of the 
General Staff, the emergence of career civil servants specializing in military affairs 
was hindered. In many democratic countries similar functions to the General Staff 
such as military budget are entirely in the hands of a civilian technical cadres155. The 
1982 Constitution did not change the status of the Chief of Staff but reinforced its 
prestige by Article 117 that declared the Chief of Staff as commander in chief during 
wartime. 
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4.5.1.3 National Security Council 
 
National Security Council (hereafter NSC), consisting of the President, the main 
cabinet ministers, the Chief of Staff, and the serving force commanders, was 
established by the Constitution of 1961, Article 111 to advise the government on 
defense and security. It is argued that NSC was introduced as an embodiment of the 
bureaucracy’s primacy over the popularly elected parliament156. With the 
amendments in early 1970s, the power of military members and the primary 
functions of the NSC were extended157. Under the Constitution of 1982, Article 118 
enhanced the position of NSC, “The NSC shall submit to the council of ministers its 
views on taking decisions and ensuring necessary coordination with regard to the 
formulation, establishment, and implementation of national security policy of the 
State.” It is stated that the recommendations of the NSC would be given priority 
consideration by the council of ministers. Moreover, the number and weight of senior 
commanders participating in the NSC also increased at the expense of civilian 
members. Under the 1982 constitution, Article 118, the position of the NSC was 
enhanced: the recommendations of the NSC would be given priority consideration by 
the Council of Ministers. The number and weight of the senior commanders 
participating in the NSC also increased at the expense of civilian members. Finally, 
NSC and the NSC Secretariat established by Law158 No: 2945 on 09/11/1983, served 
as the primary legal platform where military could participate in the civilian 
authorities’ decision-making process. NSC turned out to be the most decisive leg of a 
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dual system of executive decision making, the other leg being the council of 
ministers.159 NSC has been a legal-constitutional channel for military to exert power 
on the executive branch of government. 
NSC influenced the politics also through the National Security Policy Documents 
(hereafter NSPD) that is clarifying the ‘national security concept’. NSPDs are 
prepared by the Secretariat and turn into government policy after being accepted by 
the NSC without any input from Parliament either at the debating or ratification 
stages. These documents have influenced the functioning of the executive body 
innegligibly. The codification of laws pertaining to internal security, anti-terrorism, 
maintenance of public order, political activities and public debate and military 
jurisdiction over civilians has been all drafted in line with the NSPDs. The Decrees 
with the Force of Law No: 174 and 176 enforced in 1983 stated that Ministries would 
function in line with the ‘national security policy’.160 There were also other legal 
arrangements that facilitate a seat to the officers from National Security Council 
General Secretariat or the General Staff in the governing board of various state 
executive institutions such as the Radio and Television Supreme Council161 or the 
Council on Higher Education162.  
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4.5.1.4 The State Security Courts 
 
The State Security Courts were established in 1973 with a law amending the 
Constitution of 1961 in 1971. The State Security Courts were established in order to 
curb political violence. In the State Security Courts, the Army officers presided over 
civilian trials. Its role is defined in the Constitution of 1982 Article 143 as to deal 
with the offenses against the indivisible integrity of State with its territory and 
nation, the free democratic order, or against the Republic whose characteristics are 
defined in the Constitution, and offenses directly involving the internal and external 
security of the State. Later, on 16/06/1983, the Act on the Establishment and 
Procedures of the State Security Courts clarified the Court’s role. The status of the 
military judges called the independence and impartiality of the Court into question 
by international agents such as The European Court of Human Rights, Amnesty 
International. Military Judges were interpreted as a legal-constitutional channel for 
military to exert power on the judicial branch of government. 
 
4.5.1.5 The Office of the President 
 
During the 1960-1989 period, a succession of presidents with military backgrounds 
reinforced the privileged position of the military in the polity. The former general 
presidents were interpreted as a balance between the civilian government and the 
TAF. Actually, the Presidents tried to play a consensual role between the government 
and the TAF in times of crises and acted as a channel of communication. Under the 
Constitution of 1982, the office of the President became the locus of the state with 
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extended powers. The third civilian president of the Republic, Süleyman Demirel’s 
active role in the 28 February 1997 process of military intervention supported the 
argument that coming from civilian or military backgrounds, the prominent role of 
the President is the management of the political equilibrium of the status quo. 
 
4.6 Political Globalization, Transformation to a Liberal Democratic State: The 
Significance of the European Anchor in the Turkish Context 
 
Cold War rivalry and Turkey’s role as a NATO ally created an international structure 
that facilitated the emergence of a national security state in Turkey despite of the 
democratic wave of the third globalization. However, the support of the international 
politics to this structure began to diminish by the 1980s with the heading of Cold 
War to an end and emergence of democratic transitions in Southern Europe via the 
European Community. Moreover, Neo-liberal economic policies turned into a norm 
for the developing economies and the etatism163 of the authoritarian-bureaucratic 
Turkish state could no longer continue under the pressure of international institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund. The so-called 24th January regulations and 
the post-coup Özal government initiated economic liberalism in Turkey in 
accordance with the Neo-Liberal doctrine. The policies of Özal government triggered 
long suppressed social groups into politics again. These internal developments set the 
stage for the rise of international influence in Turkish politics. Actually, even an 
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external anchor constitutes a powerful driving force for change, the primary impetus 
for change, nonetheless, needs to originate from domestic actors164. Özal government 
and growing social groups who would later be called as pro-Europe coalition were 
the domestic actors alongside with the state elite.  
After the 1980 Coup, Council of Europe emerged as an important international 
institution influencing the process of democratization in Turkey165. This role of the 
Council of Europe was inherited to European Community (contemporary European 
Union) in 14 April 1987 when Turkish government formally applied to join the EC 
as a Full member. This move led to a considerable increase in European influence on 
the process of democratization in Turkey166. “Potential EU membership creates both 
conditions and incentives, constituting a powerful engine of democratization and 
transformation in candidate countries in the process167.” Multi-party politics and 
economic liberalization were initiated well before under the influence of external 
pressures, however an external anchor per se failed to provide an appropriate mix of 
conditions and incentives to induce a major transformation in Turkey’s domestic 
politics, especially in the authoritarian-bureaucratic state.  
 
4.6.1 The New Europe 
 
The EU possesses an institutionalized framework, which readily transmits the kind of 
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influences and pressures that affect the course of democratization. With the Southern 
European enlargement during the course of the 1980s, EC played an important role 
in the process of democratic consolidation of Spain, Greece and Portugal. In fact, in 
the course of the 1980s and 1990s, ‘the New Europe’ has placed even more emphasis 
on the quality of democratization and human rights as part of her emerging 
identity168. There are mainly two reasons for that. First, the European Economic 
Community has transformed to European Community, which highlights the political 
characteristics of the entity. In this political entity, the greatest consideration had 
been given to democracy and human rights. Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
led European countries to have been less concerned about strategic and military 
cooperation. Consequently, democracy and human rights became an important 
dimension of foreign relations of European Community169. So, Turkey was 
confronted with a changed international structure and Europe that necessitates a high 
standard in the quality of democracy and the achievement of civil and human rights 
that is the high tide of the third globalization. 
 
4.6.2 Application for Full Membership and the Strengthening of European 
Anchor 
 
Following the 1980 military coup, while bilateral relations were not alarming for 
Turkey, the relations with the European Community and the Council of Europe 
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developed along a more problematic line raising questions about Turkey's place in a 
democratic Europe. After the military coup the issues of democracy and human 
rights in Turkey became a major item on Turkey's economic as well as political 
relations with EC. The Commission issued a statement on the day of the military 
coup took indicating that `it is following with grave concern the course of events in 
Turkey'. The statement also expressed the Commission's `hope' that human rights 
would be respected and that democratic institutions would be quickly restored170. 
The European Parliament had a debate on the situation in Turkey one week after the 
coup and adopted a resolution that expressed its concern about political and civil 
rights and the physical safety of detainees. As Turkey was not moving towards the 
restoration of democracy as quickly as it had promised, The EC took harsh measures 
such as suspending economic aid program. The EC Turkey Joint Parliamentary 
Committee also ceased to meet following the military coup in 1980171.  The Council 
of Europe also reacted critically to the military coup in Turkey172. Some 
parliamentarians, particularly socialists, were pressing for the suspension of Turkey's 
membership on the grounds that the Council did so when the Colonels' coup took 
place in Greece in 1967. The Assembly mobilized its organs to follow the 
developments in Turkey closely and exert pressure on the military regime. As far as 
the Council of Europe's attitude is concerned there were two prevailing approaches 
within the Council; one that was basically promoted by Socialists, Communists and 
the Greeks pressed for the punishment of the military regime for suspension of 
democracy and suppression of political activists by expelling Turkey from the 
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Council173. There was another approach that advocated a policy of keeping Turkey 
within the Council of Europe on the ground that this would make easier the return of 
Turkey to parliamentary democracy and respect for human rights174. At the end the 
prevailing view was that the Council should neither be too soft about the suspension 
of democracy and violation of human rights nor press too hard for the expulsion of 
Turkey. Therefore, Turkey's membership issue was kept on the agenda throughout 
the period and membership in the Parliamentary Assembly was suspended175. 
The period 1980-83 witnessed an intense international debate about the future of 
democracy and human rights in post-coup Turkey. The military regime came under 
fierce attack from European quarters, particularly the Council of Europe, the 
European Community, the European Parliament, trade unions, other human rights 
organizations and individual countries. After the establishment of civilian political 
order, Özal government attempted to restore relations with the European Community 
as soon as possible. A number of significant steps were taken by the government to 
normalize relations and Turkish parliamentarians resumed their seats in the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as early as April 1984. The Özal 
government moved for EC membership by an official application on 14 April 
1987176.  Thus, Turkey became more vulnerable to the European pressures in the 
realm of democracy and human rights, moving more into the EC’s sphere of 
influence177. Ali Karaosmanoğlu says “This move led to a considerable increase in 
                                                 
173 Official Report of Debates, 33rd Session, 13 May 1981.  
174 Dağı, İhsan Duran. 1996. “Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980-83:  The Impact of European 
Diplomacy” Middle Eastern Studies. 32(2). Retrieved from www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/dagi.htm 
on 20/12/2003. 
175 Karaosmanoğlu, Ali. 1994. “The Limits to International Influence for Democratization.” In Heper, 
Metin and Ahmet Evin, eds. Politics in the Third Turkish Republic. Boulder: Westview, 129. 
176 Baç, Meltem Müftüler. 2001. Türkiye ve AB: Soğuk Savaş Sonrası İlişkiler. İstanbul: Alfa, 39. 
177 Uğur, Mehmet. 2000. Avrupa Birligi ve Türkiye: Bir dayanak/inanırıcılık ikilemi. İstanbul: Everest; 
Dağı, İhsan Duran. 2000. İnsan Hakları, Küresel Siyaset ve Türkiye. İstanbul: Boyut.  
 73 
European influence on the process of democratization in Turkey178”. Similarly, Udo 
Steinbach thinks “the most significant event in Turkey’s international affairs after the 
return to democracy was its application for full membership in the European 
Community in April 1987179”.  
 
4.6.3 The Rejection of Membership Application and the European Concerns 
about Civil-Military Relations in Turkey 
 
The European Community on economic and political grounds rejected Turkey’s 
membership application. Turkey’s continuing democratic deficits and weak human 
rights record were the political justifications for the rejection180. The wave of 
democracy in Europe that skyrocketed after the end of the Cold War did not affect 
Turkey initially. On the contrary, the political role of the military increased in the 
1990s. The continuing low intensity war against the terrorist organization, PKK and 
the struggle against Islamic Fundamentalism within the country were the major 
reasons for the unique situation in Turkey.  Turkish state was not able to join 
democratic transitions. As a result, the focus of Turkish policy makers shifted 
towards the reactivation of the Customs Union that had been the principal objective 
of the Ankara agreement181. The Customs Union agreement came into effect at the 
end of the 1995. The impact of the EC in the form of the Customs Union and related 
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conditionality began to increase in the direction of democratization in Turkey.  
As reforms in the economic arena reached to a certain stage, the European 
Commission specifically marks out certain institutional areas of civil military 
relations as requiring reform. In the Agenda 2000 document that was adopted on July 
1997, the Commission gave the following assessment on Turkey:  
"Recent developments in the administration and the education system, 
while intended to strengthen secularism, nonetheless underline the 
particular role of the military in Turkish society… There are ambiguities in 
the Turkish legal system with regard to civilian political control of the 
military182.”  
 
Moreover, in 1998 Commission reported:  
“[S]everal factors prevent these authorities from functioning in the same 
way as they do in the Member States of the EU. The National Security 
Council demonstrates the major role played by the army in political life. 
The army is not subject to civil control and sometimes even appears to act 
without the government's knowledge when it carries out certain large-scale 
repressive military operations. The judicial system includes emergency 
courts (the state security courts) that are not compatible with a democratic 
system and run counter to the principles of the European Convention on 
Human Rights… The lack of civilian control of the army gives cause for 
concern. This is reflected by the major role played by the army in political 
life through the National Security Council. A civil, non-military solution 
must be found to the situation in south-eastern Turkey, particularly since 
many of the violations of civil and political rights observed in the country 
are connected in one way or another with this issue. The Commission 
acknowledges the Turkish government's commitment to combat human 
rights violations in the country but this has not so far had any significant 
effect in practice. The process of democratic reform on which Turkey 
embarked in 1995 must continue.183”  
 
The stance of the EU against the role of the military in Turkish political life became 
apparent in the 1999 regular report: “Through the National Security Council, the 
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Military continues to have an important influence in many areas of political life. The 
National Security Council continues to play a major role in political life.184” The 
2000 regular report also mentioned that: 
“Civilian control over the military still needs to be improved (see also 
section below on the National Security Council). Contrary to EU, NATO 
and OSCE standards, instead of being answerable to the Defence Minister, 
the Chief of General Staff is still accountable to the Prime Minister. It is 
also noted that the Council of Higher Education, which controls the 
activities of the institutions of higher education, as well as the Higher 
Education Supervisory Board, include one member selected by the Chief of 
General Staff185.” 
 
Lastly, perhaps “the clearest expression of the Commission’s view186” on the civil-
military issue came in the 2001 regular report: “The basic features of a democratic 
system exist in Turkey, but a number of fundamental issues, such as civilian control 
of the military, remain to be effectively addressed187.” Nevertheless, in the absence 
of visible prospect for full membership, the EU (former EC) anchor proved to be a 
weak anchor in terms of inducing core reforms in the Turkish political structure188. 
The institutional basis of the national security state kept untouched. There existed an 
anchor/credibility dilemma inherent in Turkey-EU relations189. Turkish authorities 
interpreted the weak EU anchor as evidence of weak commitment on the part of the 
EU. Similarly, the EU interpreted failure to undertake reforms in sufficient depth as a 
sign of weak commitment on the Turkish part. 
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4.6.4 Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era, The Acceleration of the 
Transformation 
 
The decisive turning point in Turkish – EU relations came in late 1999 after the 
major excuse of the Turkish military to dominate the political system, the war against 
terrorism, came nearly to an end with the capture of the leader of PKK. In the 
Helsinki summit of December 1999, the agenda was whether Turkey has the ability 
to transform its own state and domestic institutions in line with European norms. The 
European leaders with the support of the U.S. government agreed to give Turkey a 
chance for accession and Turkey, for the first time, was offered a candidate state 
status. The 2000 Accession Partnership document of the European Commission 
clarified the dual transformation demanded from the Turkish state in both economic 
and political spheres in line with the so-called Copenhagen Criteria:  
"Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and, protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning 
market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure 
and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the 
candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.190" 
  
The Accession period refers to the most of the basis of the supra role of the TAF in 
the political system that are mentioned above: National Security Council, State 
Security Courts, State of Emergency and Anti-Terrorism regulations191. The 
transformation in these areas was not expected to be without resistance but a series 
unexpected domestic developments helped the launching of the transformation. The 
economic crises of the November 2000 and February 2001, biggest in the history of 
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the republic, created a strong public support for the transformation of the existing 
state structure. 
Turkey pledged to transform its state structure in accordance with the European 
norms in the National Program of March 2001. National Program includes all the 
economic and political criteria covered in the Accession Partnership. The political 
criteria are especially important for our topic because they include the role of the 
TAF in the political system. Turkish state has achieved more or less the liberalization 
of the economic system but the authoritarian-bureaucratic and security minded 
political structure resisted change and a liberal democratic regime could not be 
achieved. National Program includes the creation of such a regime.  
The implementation of the National Program began in November 2001 with the 
changes in the State Security Courts Law. It was followed by three so-called 
Adjustment Packages including changes in laws related to various issues such as the 
freedom of expression, political activity and capital punishment. The abolition of the 
capital punishment had created the first important resistance against the 
transformation. A campaign against the abolition of the capital punishment began 
including one of the coalition member, MHP that assumed the leadership of the anti-
EU coalition. On the other hand, civil society organizations organized a public 
campaign called ‘Movement for Europe 2002’ to support transformation. Another 
coalition party, Anavatan, supports these pro-European groups.  
This turbulent launching of the transformation was stabilized by two important 
developments. First, a liberal-democrat general, Hilmi Özkök was nominated as the 
Chief of the Staff in the summer of 2002. Özkök on different occasions states that 
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TAF prefers to solve problems in a democratic fashion and is in favor of the EU192.  
Şener identified an Özkök doctrine meaning a stress on “political solutions to 
political problems193.” Özkök was well exposed the ideas of the “democratic control 
of the armed forces” as conceived of by NATO when he was working in the NATO 
headquarters. Since the end of the Cold War, democratic and civilian control f the 
military has turned a common priority of NATO and it embraces a clear 
constitutional division of authority between civil and military sectors, parliamentary 
control of the defense budget and governmental discretion over the professional, 
institutional and political activities of the military194.  
Second, the Justice and Development Party (Hereafter AKP) who openly supported a 
pro-EU stance in its election campaign won a landslide victory in November 3rd 
general elections195. The AKP found social support especially from the medium and 
small-scale industrialists whose numbers and economic activities have been growing 
throughout the society. It also established alliances with the poor and disadvantaged 
groups, mobilized civil society organizations voicing the religious segments of 
society in terms of recognition. The AKP, in spite of its strong Islamist roots, looked 
like a European social democrat party of the Global Third Way type in terms of its 
commitment to EU-related reforms and the goal of establishing a genuinely 
pluralistic and multi-cultural society. The Global Third Way is defined as an 
alternative mode of societal and economic modernization that attempts to establish a 
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linkage between state, economy and social justice, in order to cope with the serious 
challenges that globalization has been generating on national economies196. 
Moreover, on the part of AKP, there is an understanding that the EU could provide 
certain protection for Islamists in Turkey and enable them to be vocal in their 
identity claims197. 
 The December 2002 Copenhagen Summit of the EU meant a new phase in Turkish – 
EU relations. During the Summit, the AKP tried to commit the EU that it is not an 
Islamic party but a center-right party supporting very strongly Turkey’s accession to 
the EU. Although successful in this respect, the AKP did not get a determined 
negotiation date in 2003. In the Copenhagen Summit of 2002 the borders of the new 
enlarged Europe were discussed. The issue was not only the ability of Turkey to 
transform its own state and domestic institutions in line with the European norms as 
it had been the case in the Helsinki Summit but the future direction of the EU project. 
Turkey received a conditional date for the start of the accession negotiations, 
meaning that if Turkey achieves a successful realization of the dual transformation of 
its state, then the negotiations will start after December 2004 without delay.  
In the post-Copenhagen period, major steps were taken in the transformation of the 
state. The AKP government passed five major political reforms packages in 2003 and 
one in May 2004. these were enacted in January 2003 (the fourth package), in 
February 2003 (the fifth), in July 2003 (the sixth), in August 2003 (the seventh), in 
December 2003 (the eighth), and May 2004 (the ninth). 
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The sixth and seventh package represents a major turning point in the transformation 
process because for the first time the political elite found itself in a position to tackle 
the thorny question of civil-military relations. The balance that was struck by the 
military through three coups between political and state elites came revised during 
this period. The reforms in 2003 significantly curbed the legal basis of the role of the 
military in politics. The executive power powers and areas of responsibility of the 
National Security Council, the main institutional organ of the military dominance on 
politics, were limited. Actually, the seventh package eliminates the structural means 
with which the Turkish military has influenced the political system in the past. New 
reform measures include198: Firstly, limiting the executive powers and areas of 
responsibility of the National Security Council. Previously, the Council was headed 
by the military and had sole responsibility for drafting Turkey's national security and 
foreign policy doctrines and passing them to the government for implementation. 
Now, the National Security Council is to become an advisory board. Secondly, 
increasing the civilian presence on the National Security Council. The post of 
National Security Council secretary-general, hitherto filled by an army general, can 
now be held by a civilian, to be appointed by the president from a list of candidates 
selected by the prime minister. Thirdly, subjecting the National Security Council to 
executive authority. Previously, the National Security Council met monthly and 
communicated policy to the cabinet, thereby setting the political tempo for Ankara. 
Now, the National Security Council is to convene only every other month and report 
to the deputy prime minister. In addition to reform packages, the Parliament 
approved a bill in December 2003, attempting to remove policies of secrecy 
governing the National Security Council’s staff, by-laws and regulations, allowing 
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decisions on these matters to be published in the government’s Official Gazette. 
Moreover, the sixth reform package also abolished the Article 8 of Anti-Terrorism 
Law, and terminated its current proceedings, for which Turkey has been widely 
criticized by the Council of Europe and other international bodies.  
Finally, on May 7, 2004 the 1980 constitution was amended for the 9th time. The 
economic autonomy of TAF was curbed. The military expenditures, which were not 
publicly audited in the past, were brought under the inspection of the Court of 
Accounts. The State Security Courts, which had been established following the 1980 
military coup, were abolished. Representatives of TAF from boards that oversee 
broadcasting and education were removed. Finally, these amendments brought final 
touches to the Constitution to completely abolish capital punishment. The main 
reason why the seventh package passed through the Turkish parliament easily, with 
the public offering strong support and the military voicing only a few quiet 
reservations, was that democratization had become a political avalanche in the 
country, driven by many powerful catalysts, including the prospect of EU accession. 
There is wide consensus among Turkish public opinion that political liberalization 
toward EU membership can only be good. Hence, those who are unhappy with the 
reforms nevertheless find it difficult to resist liberalization, since they do not want to 
be in the highly unpopular position of being responsible for blocking EU accession. 
The AKP government backed by a strong pro-EU coalition and major internationals 
actors engaged in a major transformation of the national security state towards a 
liberal democratic state. Major changes happened in the legal basis of the national 
security state that was outlined at the beginning of this chapter. The Cyprus 
negotiations that took place under the auspices of the UN on February 2004 served as 
a test case for the emerging civil-military balance in Turkish political system. 
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Turkish government’s opting for a change in the traditional Cyprus policy of the 
national security state confirmed the argument that Turkish state is in the process of 
transformation to a liberal democratic state. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
Globalization is neither a novel nor a linear phenomenon. An historical analysis 
would reveal that there are different trajectories of globalization in different domains. 
For the Ottoman-Turkish political community, globalization emerged as an imported 
set of ideas and institutions. The domestic political equilibrium effected the 
implementation of these ideas and institutions. Such an analysis considering the 
globalization and domestic politics can be done by a study of the operationalization 
of the state transformation in the Ottoman-Turkish context, which is the main 
purpose of this thesis. 
The first globalization that is marked by the spread of European state system had 
different patterns in different domains. Those states that produced first globalization 
as the creators of the European state system launched expansionist policies. Other 
political communities left outside of this producers group tried to catch up with the 
forerunners by concentrating on internal affairs and reform. Ottoman Empire was 
one of those states that were the consumers of first globalization and launched an 
extensive reform program to be a European style modern state. This initial stage of 
globalization could be interpreted as the ‘widening phase’ because the relationship 
between the producers and consumers created an environment where European state 
system eliminates other forms of political community and set the modern state as the 
standard. The great powers were the primary agents of the first globalization.  
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The most concrete impact of the first globalization for the Ottoman Empire was the 
security treat created by the great powers, which is conceptualized by the ‘Eastern 
Question.’ Ottoman Sultans launched staunch reform programs that started from 
military and spilled over other branches of the state. In time this reform program 
created new power centers within the Empire who advocated reform for the 
enlarging their position and power in the system, namely military-bureaucracy. 
Bureaucrats’ role is especially important in the Ottoman context to understand the 
particular character taken by the reforms. In fact, when we analyze the series of 
transformation in the Ottoman context, it becomes evident that what may have 
started from above when Sultan Selim III initiated his reform in the 1790s, by late 
19th century had assumed a very distinct new face of constitutionalism and soon 
became a weapon in the hands of various echelons of the military-bureaucracy 
against the top, that is the sultan. The power rivalry between the Sultan and the 
military-bureaucracy had determined the main contours of the Ottoman polity and 
the impact of the globalization on the Ottoman state was shaped by this rivalry. 
The second globalization was constituted by the consolidation of the modern state 
system in the form of nation state as a result of the spread of nationalism. The 
Imperialist rivalry and colonial relations made the nation state the dominant form of 
the modern state. The Ottoman Empire could not catch up with this development and 
divided into a number of nation states. The military-bureaucracy played an important 
leadership role in the establishment of the Turkish nation state. Their dominance in 
the political structure gave way to an authoritarian-bureaucratic state. However, 
external pressures against the authoritarian single party regime emerged. In the years 
after the World Wars, the deepening stage of the globalization started. In the first and 
second globalization, the issue was only the macro form of the state and the widening 
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of the state system as the only form of political community. But with the 
consolidation and institutionalization of the state system, there comes the deepening 
face of the globalization into the shell of states. A particular type of domestic regime, 
liberal democracy emerged as a global norm and states are forced to take this 
particular form.  
The European integration process has institutionalized the pressures for liberal 
democracy on Turkish national security state. Turkey has transformed into a liberal 
democratic state in important ways and the process is still continuing. Despite its 
shortages in implementation, the reform process undertaken by the last two 
governments is one of the most remarkable transformational achievements in Turkish 
political history. Institutional and legal changes of the last three years herald a 
fundamental transformation in the political life of the country.  
Whether this transformation has a strong internal impetus and would move beyond 
rhetoric is still indefinite. Although there has been substantive change in the legal 
basis of the national security state in Turkey at the core of which lays the Turkish 
Armed Forces, the new political equilibrium in Turkey is still vague. Those who are 
holding the powers at stake are on defensive and waiting for a possible break in the 
EU integration process. In this sense, December 2004 summit of the EU, at which 
Turkey is expected to be given a negotiation date, is critical for the contemporary 
process of transformation of the Turkish state. EU facilitates the most important 
external anchor of the transformation process; a failure in the part of the EU to keep 
its role would unleash anti-EU groups in Turkey that would put the transformation 
under the threat of reversal. As the Ottoman experience showed institutional changes 
do not guarantee substantive transformation. Although constitutional developments 
were achieved during the last decades of 19th century, a constitutional liberal state 
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could not be established without necessary external environment.  
The lack of individual level of analysis limits the explanatory power of the 
operationalization of the state transformation. But it is because the main actors of the 
transformation process that are the key policy makers are not very open to public, 
especially for academic research. Some interview with retired officials might be 
possible but further research could be done by basing on media interviews. So, 
follow up research on this issue might include an empirical study of perceptions of 
main actors about the transformation. Such an individual level analysis might reveal 
a great deal of information on whether institutional transformation consolidated in 
the minds of the policy makers. At the theoretical level a framework that includes 
dynamics of both globalization and fragmentation might reveal a lot about the course 
of transformation and possibilities of reversals.  
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